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FOREWORD
After every momentous event, there is usually a transition
period, in which participants in the events, whether individuals
or nation-states, attempt to chart their way into an unfamiliar
future. In the United States in this century, there are three
such transitions, each focused on America's role in the
international arena. After World War I, the American people
specifically rejected the global role for the United States
implicit in Woodrow Wilson's strategic vision of collective
security. In contrast to this "return to normalcy," after World
War II the United States moved inexorably toward international
leadership in response to the Soviet threat. The result was an
acceptance of George Kennan's strategic vision of containing the
Soviet Union on the Eurasian landmass and the subsequent bipolar
confrontation of the two superpowers in a twilight war that
lasted for over 40 years.
Sometime in the penultimate decade of the 20th century, the
United States and its allies won the cold war. Once again in the
current transition period, the primary questions revolve around
the management of power and America's role in global politics.
Once again there are the issues of change and continuity. In
terms of change, the cold war set in train a blend of integrative
and disintegrative forces and trends that are adding to the
complex tensions of the current transition. The integrative force
that increasingly linked global economies in the cold war, for
instance, also holds out the spectral potential of global
depression or, at the very least, nations more susceptible to
disintegrative actions, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
demonstrated. In a similar manner, the advances in communications
and transportation that have spread the results of medical and
scientific discoveries around the world are countered by the
malign transnational results of nuclear technology, the drug
trade, terrorism, AIDS and global warming.
All that is a reminder of the value of continuity in a
Hobbesian world still nasty, brutish and anarchic. The realist
paradigm, in other words, still obtains: nation-states are still
the primary international actors; power is still the coin of the
realm. In such a milieu, American government elites must
convince an electorate, increasingly conscious of the domestic
threats to national security, of the need to continue to exercise
global leadership in the management of power. The answer, as this
study demonstrates, is a strategic vision that incorporates a
multilateral, great power approach to international relations.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We are never completely contemporaneous with our
present. History advances in disguise; it appears on
stage wearing the mask of the preceding scene, and we
tend to lose the meaning of the play. Each time the
curtain rises, continuity has to be re-established. The
blame. . .is not history's but lies in our vision,
encumbered with memory and images learned in the past.
We see the past superimposed on the present, even when
the present is a revolution.
Regis Debray1
"WAR IS PEACE," the Ministry of Truth proclaims in George
Orwell's profoundly pessimistic prediction of the future in
1984.2 And so it was with the cold war. The irony is that one
year after Orwell had expected the Western world to be under the
complete control of Stalinism, Mikhail Gorbachev arrived on the
world scene, setting in train all the events that would reverse
the trends inaugurated at the Finland Station so many decades
before.3
The sudden end to the cold war was similar to the manner in
which World War I ended on the Eastern Front in 1918 with the
internal breakdown and unconditional withdrawal of a major
belligerent. As in 1918 with imperial Russia, no one expected to
see the end of the Soviet empire in Europe, the dissolution of
the Soviet state, and the repudiation of communism itself
throughout that disintegrating state. "In understanding the
collapse of communism and the Soviet state," Ronald Steel has
pointed out in this regard, "the strategists in government, at
universities, and in the well-financed limbo in between have been
virtually irrelevant."4 To be sure, in the most basic of all cold
war texts, George Kennan described in 1947 the possibility of
such an occurrence with a literary analogy:
Observing that human institutions often show the
greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner
decay is in reality farthest advanced, [Thomas Mann]
compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its
greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light
shines most brightly on this world when in reality it
has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with
assurance that the strong light still cast by the
Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western
world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation
which is in actuality on the wane?5
But he did not anticipate a peaceful metamorphosis. "Strange
things have happened," Kennan wrote in 1951 when examining the
possibility of Soviet toleration of its own collapse, "though not

much stranger."6
The general surprise at the sudden and relatively quiet
outcome of the long twilight struggle was due, in part, to the
Orwellian mix of peace and war. For just as war was to Clausewitz
the continuation of policy by other means, so was the cold war
warfare by other, for the most part, nonlethal means.
Nevertheless, it was still conflict--a struggle that lasted for
two generations with massive stakes that included a geopolitical
rivalry for control of the Eurasian landmass and ultimately the
world, and an ideological one in which philosophy in the deepest
sense of mankind's self-definition was very much at issue. The
end of the cold war, then, represents a victory at least as
decisive and one-sided as the defeat of Napoleonic France in
1815, or of Imperial Germany in 1918, or of the Axis in 1945. In
terms of the actual capitulation, that moment may have come at
the November 19, 1990 Paris summit when Gorbachev accepted the
conditions of the victorious coalition by describing the
unification of Germany that had come about completely on Western
terms as a "major event"--a description that Zbigniew Brzezinski
has termed the functional equivalent to the acts of surrender in
the railroad car at Compiègne in November 1918 and on the USS
Missouri in August 1945.7
The defeat of the Soviet Union settled the remaining issues
left over from World War II with the exception of a divided Korea
and the Russian occupation of the Kurile Islands. After both the
major wars of this century, it took some time for the
international order to settle into what proved to be a relatively
stable period until overturned by the next war (or war
equivalent). A similar process is currently underway throughout
the world in this third major transition period for the United
States in the 20th century. Moreover, the victors of the cold
war, like their predecessors in 1918 and 1945, are proclaiming a
new world order in which, as President Bush described it,
"nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and
justice. . .where the strong respect the rights of the weak."8
The success of this or any other world order will depend on
the role of the United States, as it did in the transition
periods after 1918 and 1945. That role in the current transition
is usually addressed in terms of change ranging from a
diminishment of military threats to an increase in global
interdependence. And in fact the unabridged Webster Dictionary
defines change in terms of "transition"--a "passage" in
historical context, "from an earlier to a later form with the
blending of old and new features. . . ."9 The added emphasis in
the definition, however, also highlights the importance of
continuity along with change in any transition period. Stressing
this continuity, James Rosenau has pointed out, "serves as a
useful reminder that even the most pronounced changes have
antecedents, that the past cannot be ignored, and that there is
always a danger of mistaking the appearance of upheaval for the
dynamics of transformation and, thus, exaggerating the depth and

breadth of change."10
How analysts think about change and continuity shapes what
they look for; and what they look for affects what they find. It
is in this sense that Thomas Kuhn's idea of "paradigm" can play
an important role. A paradigm is a group of fundamental
assumptions that form for the scholar a picture of the world--a
shared framework that provides instruction on how to view the
object of inquiry. It is both broad and nebulous, certainly
broader than a conceptual framework since concepts derive from
paradigms. It also has much less specificity than a theory or a
model, both of which are organized propositions that relate the
concepts that are found in a paradigm. In this regard, Kuhn
emphasized, a paradigm does not provide answers; it is not
knowledge itself. Instead, it holds out the promise of answers,
pointing the way to knowledge by providing "a criterion for
choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted,
can be assumed to have solutions."11
When the paradigm is not taken for granted, however, when
there is a growing sense that existing institutions no longer are
adequate to meet the problems posed by an environment that they
have in part created, then there occurs what Kuhn has called a
paradigm shift. Major shifts of the Copernican, Newtonian and
Einsteinian variety come about because of a profound awareness of
anomaly which has lasted so long and penetrated so deeply that "a
state of growing crisis" is created.12 Ptolemaic astronomy, for
example, was in a scandalous state long before Copernicus
appeared. When that paradigm was first developed during the last
two centuries before Christ, it was extremely successful in
predicting the changing positions of planets and stars. But
predictions under the Ptolemaic system never quite conformed with
the best available observations. Solutions to these relatively
minor discrepancies were sought over the centuries by Ptolemy's
successors. By the early 16th century, an increasing number of
astronomers recognized that the old system was not sufficient--a
recognition of a growing crisis state that was a prerequisite to
the rejection by Copernicus of the Ptolemaic paradigm and his
search for a new one.13
Major shifts such as this are difficult. So long as the
tools provided by a paradigm are capable of solving the problems
it defines, those tools will continue to be used. Just as it is
in manufacturing, Kuhn pointed out, "retooling is an extravagance
to be reserved for the occasion that demanded it. The
significance of crises is the indication they provide that an
occasion for retooling has arrived."14 Such an occasion arrived
in Europe in the 17th century at the end of the Thirty Years War.
A sense of crisis had been growing for centuries concerning the
hierarchical, universalist, medieval paradigm of international
relations, as emerging dynastic states began to exercise the
rudiments of national sovereignty.15 The destructive chaos of the
Thirty Years War provided the culminating catalyst for the shift
at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to an anarchic, state-centric,

realist paradigm that has dominated approaches to change and
continuity in international relations ever since.16
A similar sense of crisis with the realist, "Westphalian"
paradigm has been evolving in the intervening years, particularly
in this century of total wars which has given new urgency to the
need for the management of power. Efforts to meet that need have
been tied inextricably with the attempts by the United States to
define its international role in the wake of both world wars. The
current post-cold war transition period, which began some time in
the penultimate decade of the 20th century, is no exception. As a
result, the United States faces the same question posed with
negative results after 1918 and left unanswered after 1945
because of the cold war: Should this transition period be the
occasion described by Kuhn for retooling? Is it time, in other
words, for a major shift from the realist, state-centric paradigm
of international relations?
The purpose of this study is to provide a general answer to
this question. The first step is to describe the realist paradigm
and trace its evolution through major post-war transition periods
in European and world history up through the brief transition
after World War II for the United States. The cold war, which
influenced that post-1945 transition period, is the key to the
assessment. For it is this twilight struggle's domination of the
American national consciousness for over four decades that will
determine ultimately the U.S. approach to world politics and the
realist paradigm in the current transition period.
It is here that Kuhn offers additional conceptual help by
pointing out that lesser, multiple paradigms can cause or inhibit
shifts from one dominant paradigm to another.17 As a second step,
this study will create two such lesser paradigms for viewing the
U.S. experience in the cold war. They are frameworks that George
Orwell would appreciate. One is that of a "long peace"; the other
that of a "long war." Together, these two perspectives of
America's recent past form the basis for analysis concerning the
question, in this third major transition period for the nation in
the 20th century, of change and continuity in the larger realist
paradigm of international affairs.

CHAPTER 2
THE ENDURING PARADIGM
We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual
enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests
it is our duty to follow.
Lord Palmerston, 184818
In 1648, Pope Innocent X stated that the Peace of Westphalia
was "null, void, invalid, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane,
empty of meaning and effect for all time."19 It was an
understandable reaction to a treaty which not only confirmed the
Lutheran schism in central Europe, but significantly reduced the
political authority of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. In
place of the centralized, hierarchical universalism embodied in
those two great symbols of Christian unity, the Westphalian peace
provided legitimacy to the concepts of sovereignty and dynastic
authority, thus creating a framework for a paradigm that would
sustain Europe's political fragmentation. Conversely, the peace
withdrew legitimacy from the medieval structure as well as any
other mode of centralized control to include all forms of
hegemony.
In this way, Westphalia sanctified centrifugal forces in
Europe that resulted in both an anarchial international system of
sovereign states and the internal consolidation of those units.
The approach represented a western political tradition going back
to Thucydides' Melian dialogue in which the Athenians contended
"that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and
the weak accept what they have to accept."20 The tradition was
renourished with the birth of the modern state system in Western
Europe in 1648. That state-centric, "realist" paradigm has
generally dominated efforts to conceptualize and theorize about
world politics and the management of power ever since.
Power is the key to the three fundamental assumptions of the
paradigm. To begin with, nation-states are the basic actors that
account for behavior in international relations--in Hans
Morgenthau's words, "the ultimate point of reference of. . .
foreign policy," since they alone are sovereign and can thus
marshal the necessary power for interactions in global
politics.21 Second, political life is divided into "domestic" and
"international" arenas, each one subject to its own laws. On the
domestic side, only the government has sufficient power to
regulate the activities of all other societal entities in order
to maintain order and stability. In the international arena,
there is no such leviathan, and anarchy reigns.
The final assumption rests on the previous two.
anarchy in the international system, each state must
increase its power or succumb. "The Realist," Robert
pointed out in this regard, "because he is skeptical
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ability of nations to transcend their self-interest, sees the
struggle for national power as the distinguishing characteristic
of international relations."22 Or as Cicero asked in an earlier
age: "What can be done against force without force?"23
The question was not immediately addressed after 1648. The
norms of the old hierarchical, centralized paradigm had been
destroyed. The conceptual framework of the new paradigm did not
appear to require international attempts at management of power.
As a result, war was only proscribed in terms of changing the
1648 settlement. And in fact the negotiations at Westphalia were
more concerned with the past than with the future, producing a
static balance that did not foresee the rise of Louis XIV, the
expansion of the European state system into the conflict for
colonies, the sudden decline of Sweden, and the rise of Russia
and Prussia. These and even more pronounced changes in the
ensuing centuries, particularly in terms of the nature of war,
would begin a process, reflected in the pattern of post-war
settlements over the years, that increasingly focused on the
management of power while concomitantly bringing some of the
underlying assumptions of the realist paradigm into question.
1713 and 1815.
The War of the Spanish Succession marked the last bid by
Louis XIV for hegemony in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.
After that long and exhausting conflict, the Utrecht settlements
of 1713-15 were designed primarily to resolve the issue of
hegemony by excluding both the French Bourbons and the Austrian
Hapsburgs from the Spanish dynasty. This meant, in turn, that
some type of decentralized balance of power, instead of some form
of centralized hierarchical control, would continue to dominate
as the system for managing power. At the same time, however, this
exclusion also set a precedence for a nascent centralizing
tendency of the powers acting in concert to determine the
dynastic issues of each state--a tendency confirmed in the
recognition by the Utrecht settlements of Frederick William,
Elector of Brandenburg, as King of Prussia. Equally important,
this precedence was established further at Utrecht in the socalled "British Plan" to move beyond the unilateral intervention
device initiated at Westphalia to one that incorporated the
general idea of a community of powers as a means of settlement
enforcement.24
All that notwithstanding, the Utrecht settlements were
essentially mired in the past, solving a problem posed by France
and Spain, but failing to address fully the more fundamental
problems associated with the paradigm shift that had left a
system of independent states driven by dynastic ambitions. The
primary reason was a lack of urgency. Warfare simply did not
require a more centralized control of power. And in fact, because
of the limited nature of conflict between Westphalia and Utrecht,
war was generally perceived as a practical instrument of policy.

In the post-Utrecht era of the 18th century, warfare became
even more circumscribed, involving carefully modulated maneuvers
for incremental gains--all in accordance with the balance and
elegance of the Age of Reason, as well as the desire not to
damage costly professional forces. This restraint, in marked
contrast to the conduct of the Thirty Years War, also extended to
the civilians, who were increasingly isolated from campaigns in
keeping with Frederick the Great's ideal that they should not
even be aware at the time of conflict that a state of war
existed. An important consequence of all this was that even if
they were not always satisfied with their own position in the
state system created in 1648 and reconfirmed in the Utrecht
settlements, the aristocrats and dynasts who comprised the major
18th century leadership in Europe were content with the system
itself. As a result, the great powers in that era developed very
little capacity to act together in terms of managing power, with
the exception of the Polish partitions which were perceived, at
least by Frederick the Great, as a concerted great power plan to
secure the peace of Europe. For these leaders, the international
anarchy implicit in the realist paradigm was barely perceptible
in the classical balance of power age.25
All that changed in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars with the creation of French national armies, which grew ever
larger and more unconstrained in response to the public passions
and perceptions of the nation in danger. These larger standing
forces could not subsist on French territory and increasingly
were assigned abroad as the wars continued, their maintenance
borne by the occupied states. As a consequence, means began to
dictate ends--the obverse of strategy--with France acting less
because of defined interests and more in terms of what was
possible. The careful calculation of means and ends that had
marked the period after the Utrecht settlements thus gave way to
almost continual conflict, much of it often without any apparent
objective other than that of enriching France.26
By 1814 the allies managed to form a permanent coalition
against Napoleon, but only after 22 years of incessant warfare
and revolutionary upheaval, recurrent assaults on the principles
of dynastic legitimacy, unparalleled casualties and destruction,
and enormous economic strains on all states. Even then it took
herculean efforts on the part of Clemens von Metternich, the
Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, and Robert Castlereagh, the
Foreign Minister of Great Britain, before the Treaty of Chaumont
was signed in March of that year, stipulating that the alliance
was to continue in effect for 20 years and providing mutual
guarantees against possible French attempts to undo the
forthcoming peace treaty. There was no question that Chaumont was
not designed for general enforcement of the peace. Nevertheless,
the move back toward centralization of power within the overall
realist paradigm was unmistakable, particularly when the allied
leaders declared publicly after signing the wartime treaty that
"they did not come to the conference as mere envoys of the four

courts,. . .but as men entitled to treat for Peace with France in
the name of Europe, which is but a single entity."27
This great power role was further elaborated in June 1815 at
the First Peace of Paris which called for the Vienna Congress to
establish "the relations from whence a system of real and
permanent balance of power in Europe is to be derived, [and]
shall be regulated at the Congress upon the principles
determined. . .by the Allied Powers amongst themselves."28 Those
principles evolved the following November in the Quadruple
Alliance which created a league to enforce the peace against
France. Once again like Chaumont, however, the great powers did
not devise a system to govern Europe or to resolve general
conflict. There was no formal mechanism for collective action and
enforcement. Such action would emerge only through negotiations
based on consensus by all five powers. But the alliance did
incorporate Castlereagh's idea of a permanent mechanism for
monitoring compliance with the peace settlement, by holding
periodic great power meetings "for the consideration of the
measures which shall be considered the most salutary for the
repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of peace
in Europe."29
"Repose" was the operative word for the great powers during
this transition. There was general agreement among them that the
revolutionary social system spawned by the French Revolution had
caused war and that conversely war had itself created conditions
of social dissolution. As a consequence, they concluded that if
war could be prevented, social change could be regulated. To this
end, each of the great powers exercised restraint within the
system they created and at least occasionally subordinated their
national interests to the European context of order and
prevention of conflict. "Politics is the science of the vital
interests of States, in its widest meaning," Metternich wrote in
this regard.
Since, however, an isolated State no longer exists. .
.we must always view the Society of States as the
essential condition of the modern world. The great
axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge
of the true political interests of all states; it is
upon these general interests that rests the guarantee
of their existence. The establishing of international
relations on the basis of reciprocity under the
guarantee of respect for acquired rights. .
.constitutes in our time the essence of politics.30
This ostensible change in the realist paradigm of
international relations was actually based on continuity, since
it created a static formula for enforcing the peace in a static
world. But because that world could not be restored, the formula
for peace enforcement had to change; and this in turn threatened
to lead to a shift in the overall realist paradigm that Great
Britain and many lesser powers could not accept. Castlereagh held

to the traditional concept of a casus foederis, arguing
throughout the series of allied congresses after the Vienna
settlements that great power action could only be in response to
an overriding external danger. The Quadruple Alliance, he argued
in 1820, was never intended "as a union for the Government of the
World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of
other states. . . ."
The principle of a state interfering by force in the
internal affairs of another. . .is always a question
of the greatest possible. . .political delicacy. . .
.[To] generalize such a principle and to think of
reducing it to a System, or to impose it as an
obligation, is a Scheme utterly impractical and
objectionable.31
For Metterich and the other continental leaders, the cause
for intervention was any revolution anywhere--joint action, in
other words, before a disturbance could take an externally
aggressive form. Their "crucial battle," Henry Kissinger has
pointed out, "was the first not the last; their effort was to
prevent an overriding danger from materializing."32 All this
culminated in the November 19, 1820 Troppau Protocol which, over
Britain's objection, stipulated that any revolution that
threatened Europe's tranquility would be dealt with by either
individual or collective action. Britain had agreed to the
original concept of the concert which had required some
modification of the realist paradigm in order to provide some
measure of security for individual states. But the Troppau
Protocol proposed to accomplish this by violating national
sovereignty, the fundamental foundation for domestic security in
the state-centric Westphalian paradigm, not so much to preserve
the peace, but to save a narrow class-defined system of order.
1919.
The Concert of Europe began to erode almost from its
inception. To begin with, there was the partial isolation of
Great Britain which remained unwilling to endorse a policy of
great power intervention in the internal affairs of European
nations. In addition, new ideological divisions began to break up
the moderate conservatism of 1815. In 1830, revolution
transformed France from the reactionary monarchy of Charles X to
a liberal state on its way to the bourgeois triumph of Louis
Phillipe. In Britain, the catalyst was the 1832 Great Reform Act
which brought the middle class centrally into British politics.
The result was an increasing dichotomy of liberal Great Britain
and France and the more conservative trio of Russia, Prussia and
Austria--an alignment reinforced by the developing West-East
pattern of the Industrial Revolution. Finally, the 1848
revolutions demonstrated that war did not automatically occur
from such upheavals and that in fact, as the next two decades
were to prove, military force could stave off revolutions and war

could actually protect unreformed domestic institutions.33
In any event, the concert clearly was in operation until the
outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. And even after that conflict
and through the smaller wars of 1859, 1866 and 1870, the great
powers continued to exercise some of the restraint established at
Vienna and embodied in the 19th protocol of the 1831 conference
on the Belgian issue which stated that "chaque nation a ses
droits particuliers; mais l'Europe aussi a son droit."34 As the
century wore on, however, fewer and fewer observers attributed
the relative peace to the European Concert as a device for
managing international relations. Instead, the "long peace" was
generally perceived as a result of "progress," the growth of
civilization embodied in almost continuous advances in industry,
commerce and science. Despite the more pessimistic outlook of
those who decried the growth of materialism and decline of
morality, most people took social, political and aesthetic
progress as self-evident concomitants to those advances.35
Equally important, these trends had a major effect on
general attitudes toward war. There were, to be sure, popular
anti-war activists like Baroness Bertha von Suttner. Her 1899
novel, Die Waffen Nieder, describing an Austrian woman's
revulsion against war after the death of her husband in the 1859
Franco-Austrian War, was printed in 37 editions in over a dozen
languages. And there was Norman Angell's bestselling The Great
Illusion (1910), which argued that war was irrational on economic
grounds since the destructiveness of war was incompatible with
commerce and would thus bring modern industrial nations to ruin.
But there were many who agreed with one critic's characterization
of von Suttner as "a gentle perfume of absurdity."36 Moreover,
there were those who either agreed with or would bear out George
Bernard Shaw's observations in Major Barbara. "Well, the more
destructive war becomes," a Latin teacher asks an arms
manufacturer in that 1905 play, "the sooner it will be abolished,
eh?" "Not at all," the arms maker replies. "The more destructive
war becomes, the more fascinating we find it."37
In any event, in the years prior to World War I, there was
the general expectation that any future great power conflict
would be, in Michael Howard's description, "brief--no longer,
certainly, than the war of 1870 that was consciously or
unconsciously taken by that generation as a model."38 That
expectation was reflected in the evolution of offensive military
doctrines on the part of most great powers prior to 1914 as well
as in the general perception that protracted conflict would lead
to economic collapse--the latter demonstrated in Andrew
Carnegie's confident assertion that if war should occur, "we
won't give them any money."39 In addition, as the long period of
relative tranquility passed into the 20th century, there was an
increased tendency to see peace as decadent, corrupt and
materialistic with war--noble, uplifting, and glorious--as the
only anodyne. "How I long for the great war!" Hilaire Belloc
commented. "It will sweep Europe like a broom."40 Warfare had

thus come to be considered prior to 1914 almost universally as an
acceptable and for many people an inevitable if not a desirable
way of settling international differences. "The plain truth,"
William James observed, "is that people want war."41
The result of all this was that in the closing decades of
the "long peace," there were few vestiges left of the urgency
felt by the statesmen at Vienna to centralize the management of
power within the realist paradigm. War, the result of the
fundamental international condition of anarchy in that paradigm,
generally was no longer perceived as a major systemic problem. As
a consequence, the management of power increasingly devolved into
a decentralized balance of power system with results far removed
from the clocklike regularity that governed the limited conflicts
of the 18th century. By 1914, Europe was literally divided into
two armed camps with a balance that not only failed to prevent
war, but actually formented it. "The alliances were neither
strong nor credible enough to face down resolute action by the
adversary," one analyst has pointed out; "they were just strong
enough to drag reluctant participants into military conflict.
Instead of deterring war ex ante, they actually brought it on ex
post."42
And when that war came, it was a horrific surprise for all
participants, washing away the previous misconceptions in a tide
of blood, leaving an indelible mark across an entire generation.
The reaction of that generation was captured by the protagonist
in Tender is the Night when he revisits the Somme battlefield
after the war. "This western-front business couldn't be done
again," he explains, "not for a long time."
The young men think they could do it but they couldn't.
. . .This took religion and years of plenty and
tremendous sureties and the exact relation that existed
between the classes. . . .You had to have a wholesouled sentimental equipment going back further than
you could remember. You had to remember Christmas, and
postcards of the Crown Prince and his fiancee, and
little cafes in Valence and beer gardens in Unter den
Linden and weddings at the mairie, and going to the
Derby, and your grandfather's whiskers. . . .This kind
of battle was invented by Lewis Carroll and Jules Verne
and whoever wrote Undine, and country deacons bowling
and marraines in Marseilles and girls seduced in the
back lanes of Wurtemburg and Westphalia. Why, this was
a love battle--there was a century of middle-class love
spent here. This was the last love battle.43
The reaction of Woodrow Wilson to the Great War was no less
emphatic. He had brought a traditionally isolationist United
States into World War I by representing it as a great crusade, as
a means to create a better world. And when that conflict ended,
he continued the crusade with a vision for a new system of
managing power. That vision was a reaction to the balance-of-

power system, "that old and evil order" with its "ugly plan. .
.of alliances, of watchful jealousies, of rabid antagonisms,"
which Wilson perceived as the primary cause of the war.
Ultimately, that war had to be fought to "do away with the old
order and to establish a new one, . . .the center and
characteristic of the old order [being] that unstable thing we
used to call the 'balance of power'."44
The new system was collective security. In its pure form,
what Inis Claude calls ideal collective security, it is a system
for managing power that requires the participation of every state
in the world under a legally binding and codified commitment on
the part of these states to respond to aggression anytime and
anywhere it might occur.
The scheme is collective in the fullest sense; it
purports to provide security for all states by the
action of all states, against all states which might
challenge the existing order by the arbitrary
unleashing of their power. . . .Ideal collective
security. . .offer[s] the certainty, backed by legal
obligation, that any aggressor would be confronted with
collective sanctions.45
The new approach, like that of the concert, still had
attributes that could be explained using the assumptions of the
realist paradigm.46 Collective security was, after all, a statecentric system for managing power, focused as it was on using
states as principal actors to preserve state sovereignty. And the
methods for that preservation certainly did not shrink from the
application of force. Under Wilsonian collective security, peace
would not be based upon a precarious, unstable equilibrium with
its minimal capacity for deterrence, but upon an overwhelming
preponderance of power automatically and universally applied by a
central organization, the League of Nations, against any
aggressor nation. "Mere agreements will not make peace secure,"
Wilson emphasized.
It will be absolutely necessary that a force be
created. . .so much greater than the force of any
nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or
projected that no nation, no probable combination of
nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace
presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace
made secure by the organized major force of mankind.47
Despite all this, the full implementation of Wilsonian
collective security required a shift from the realist paradigm in
order to be accepted and thus fulfill the traditional claim in
such a shift of solving the problems that had led the old
paradigm to crisis. For while it was true that collective
security continued to focus on a world of nation-states, those
states in the Wilsonian paradigm had to be democracies founded on
the principle of nationality if the new world order was to work.

In this regard, Wilson represented a new early 20th century
belief in the linkage of authoritarianism within a nation with
aggressive behavior towards other states. Moreover, this was
explicitly linked to his perception of the uniqueness of the
American political experience. For Wilson, there was a thin line
between domestic reform in the shape of the American progressive
tradition and foreign policy. And this in turn was linked to what
he perceived as a unique historical mission with Americans acting
as the "custodians of the spirit of righteousness, of the spirit
of even-handed justice, of the spirit of hope which belies in the
perfectibility of the law and the perfectibility of human life
itself."48
Equally fundamental to the paradigm shift were the
principles of automaticity and universality involved in the
application of power against any transgressing state and
guaranteed by universal treaty obligation to enforce peace
regardless of whether it was in any individual state's immediate
interest or not. Only in the new paradigm could Wilson's linkage
of domestic law enforcement to a system for managing power in the
international arena be understood. For unless states were
required to act collectively on legal principles and not on selfinterests in a specific case, and unless neutrality was forbidden
in the face of aggression, the new concept would not add anything
significant to the traditional collective defense of alliances
and balance of power and thus would not require a paradigm shift
in order to be accepted. This problem, fundamental to any such
shift, was captured by Charles Darwin the previous century in
Origins of Species. "Although I am fully convinced of the truths
of the views given in this volume. . .," he wrote, "I by no means
expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are
stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long
course of years, from a point of view directly opposite to
mine."49
And so it was in the debates over a new world order in the
post-World War I transition period. Viewed through the prism of
the realist paradigm, the Wilsonian proposals for that order were
a series of contradictions. Nations would renege on the
automaticity in the system because the idea of "no more war,"
which was the animating motive for constructing the system, was
in tension with the "no more aggression" imperative necessary for
the system to function when challenged. The former reflected
abhorrence of war, but the latter called for going to war even if
short-term self-interest ruled against it. But even if the system
could overcome that basic tension, there was no comfort without a
paradigmatic shift. "By the very logic of its assumptions," Hans
Morgenthau has pointed out in this regard, "the diplomacy of
collective security must aim at transforming all local conflicts
into world conflicts. . .since peace is supposed to be
indivisible. . . .Thus a device intent on making war impossible
ends by making war universal."50
Negotiations based on different conceptual frameworks

produced increasingly acrimonious proceedings. "I offer my
apologies to the memory of Attila and his congeners," Georges
Clemenceau concluded in disgust as the Versailles discussions
dragged on, "but the art of arranging how men are to live is even
more complex than that of massacring them."51 Opponents in the
United States argued that the League, in contravention of the
American tradition of avoiding entangling alliances, was in fact
such an alliance, whose charter contained "clauses which
threatened the very existence of the United States as an
independent power."52 Moreover, it was argued, the system tended
to preserve the status quo regardless of merit. To attempt to
freeze for all time the distribution of power and territory,
Elihu Root pointed out, "would not only be futile; it would be
mischievous."53 Wilson, however, would not consider reservations
that he believed might mutilate Article X of the League Covenant,
with its commitment "to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all members of the League."54
The result was an impasse that Wilson attempted to
circumvent by appealing directly to the American people. The key
to the success of a new international order, he repeatedly
stressed, was America's role as a leader of nations. As a
consequence, he had made this leadership a key condition for U.S.
participation in the global system just as he was making American
involvement in international politics conditional upon the
reformation of the system. If the United States did not accept
the responsibility thrust upon it by historical events, he
warned, there would occur an even more terrible conflict than
World War I. In this regard, as Wilson biographer Arthur Link has
pointed out, Wilson represented a higher realism, "higher because
more perceptive, more in accord with ultimate reality."55
That reality included the recognition that while the United
States could not ignore a leadership role in the new
international order, that role had to be based on values that
would continue to claim American allegiance. But to undertake
that role alone, as Wilson well realized, would transform the
very nature of American society. The alternative to the League
for American security in an increasingly interdependent world, he
reminded the public, would be a garrison state requiring the
United States "to have the biggest army in the world."
There will have to be universal conscription. There
will have to be taxes such as even yet we have not
seen. There will have to be a concentration of
authority in the Government capable of using this
terrible instrument. . . .You will have to have a staff
like the German staff, and you will have to center in
the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy the
right to take instant action for the protection of the
nation.56
In essence, from Wilson's perspective, very little was being

asked of the American people except a leap of faith that he had
already made in terms of the League's efficacy. In return for
that faith, he emphasized throughout his whistle-stop tour of the
country, America would not only escape a dismal future, but be
assured of political and economic global advantage. In any event,
U.S. forces would not be required for every case of collective
action under the League. "If you want to put out a fire in Utah,"
the President concluded one speech, "you do not send to Oklahoma
for the fire engine."57
This was hardly a clarion call to sacrifice. In the end,
Wilson did not fail, as frequently maintained, because he
demanded too much from the American people. He failed despite
asking so little of them while holding out the promise of so
much. Ultimately that failure had to do with the difficulties in
making a fundamental shift in the realist paradigm during the
euphoria of a victorious post-war transition period. In the wake
of World War I, there was the demand by industry and agriculture
to end wartime controls matched by the widespread popular desire
to cut the budget and reduce taxes. The Republican Party won the
1920 election by promising to fulfill those expectations. As a
consequence, the new administration accelerated the pace of
industrial demobilization and laid the foundation for large
budget cuts, particularly those in defense, facilitated for the
most part by a massive naval disarmament program. Those cuts led
to a peace dividend, which Secretary of the Treasury Andrew
Mellon promptly provided to the American people in the form of
lower taxes.
This return to what Warren Harding termed "normalcy" proved
to be extremely popular. But ultimately it deprived the United
States of the means required to deal with many of the key
international issues in the post-war era. To begin with, the
government lacked the military power to take a role in the
enforcement of the peace treaty. Moreover, "normalcy" meant that
the United States would not forgive Allied war debts owed to
America, which in turn caused difficulties for those nations in
terms of reducing German reparations. At the same time, financial
retrenchment meant that there would be no major American role in
reconstructing the European economy.
The result was that the United States emerged from a
transition period that was supposed to have led to a new world
order without committing its power either to the achievement of
that order or to the effective maintenance of the status quo.
That neither objective was considered an urgent matter as America
returned to "normalcy" was demonstrated in President Coolidge's
1926 State of the Union Address:
The American people are altogether lacking in an
appreciation of the tremendous good fortune that
surrounds their international position. We have no
traditional enemies. We are not embarrassed over any
disputed territory. We have no possessions that are

coveted by others; they have none that are coveted by
us. Our borders are unfortified. We fear no one; no one
fears us.58
1945.
The League of Nations failed because the preconditions for
that organization's effectiveness to manage power were destroyed
in the interwar period. It was absolutely essential, for example,
that war prevention be the goal of all the great powers, dominant
over any one's sectarian national interests. But Italy in the
1920s and Germany and Japan in the 1930s undermined the dominance
of that goal. In addition, just as it had been with the Concert
of Europe, there could be no breakdown into ideological conflicts
between the great powers in the League if a return to the fully
decentralized balance-of-power system was to be avoided. But the
economic crises made many of the liberal governments of the 1920s
vulnerable to fascism, socialism and communism. Communism, in
particular, caused not only an ideological rift between Russia
and both Britain and France, but also a belief in the West that
an anti-Soviet stance was common grounds for cooperation with
National Socialist Germany.
Ultimately, as the European Concert had demonstrated, it was
also crucial that no great power return to isolation. The absence
of the United States meant that the League was still-born, since
only strong international leadership by all great powers could
have made effective the threat in the League Covenant concerning
the application of preponderant power. The withdrawal of America
into isolation and then neutrality did much to dissipate the
international consensus for more centralized management of power
that had been forged in reaction to the first total war in the
modern industrial age. The result was the familiar, dismal litany
of diplomatic events in the interwar years which ushered in the
second half of what Winston Churchill called this century's
Thirty Years War.
Early in World War II, much as President Wilson had done
throughout the previous conflict, President Roosevelt turned his
attention to the management of power in a post-war period.
Originally, Roosevelt had justified U.S. participation in the war
in idealistic, reformist terms. The Atlantic Charter, for
instance, was written in a context redolent of Wilson's Fourteen
Points. Nevertheless, there was an underlying realism to
Roosevelt's approach that was firmly anchored in the Westphalian
paradigm: his idea of forming a great power condominium to bring
order out of international anarchy. The so-called "Four
Policemen--the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
and China--would have the responsibility, as the President
described it, to "impose order on the rest of the post-war world,
bombing anyone who would not go along."59
By the time the San Francisco conference convened in 1945 to

establish the United Nations, however, there was also a growing
recognition of the need to address the basic problem of great
power aggression and antagonism, the major cause of the recently
ended cataclysm. The result was the veto power given to the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council--a vital
move from the realist perspective. For that decision was made not
in the idealistic belief that the great powers would continue to
live in peace and that the veto would never be used, but with the
expectation that there would be occasions on which it would be
used to avoid great power confrontation. That the final result
was less than the ideal vision was best expressed by the Mexican
delegate, who noted that the conference was "engaged in
establishing a world order in which the mice could be stamped out
but in which the lions would not be restrained."60
For the United States, these adjustments within the realist
paradigm were no greater than the powers at Vienna had made in
terms of the Concert of Europe. The veto provision ensured that
America retained the same freedom of action (or inaction) in
matters of collective enforcement on which it had insisted in the
past. As a consequence, there was no repetition in the 1945
Senate of the fight that had been waged there in 1919 over the
approval of an earlier charter. In joining the United Nations,
there was no assumption that the United States had compromised
its freedom to determine under which circumstances it would
employ American power.61
And that power as well as material wealth was enormous in
1945 in absolute and relative terms. The United States possessed
two-thirds of the world's gold reserve; and its GNP had increased
by more than half since 1939 in a period when all other
industrial economies were in ruins. In addition, there was
America's global prestige bolstered by armed forces deployed in
Asia and Europe as well as by atomic monopoly. All in all, it was
truly an extraordinary global situation. "Of the great men at the
top," A. J. P. Taylor once noted, "Roosevelt was the only one who
knew what he was doing; he made the United States the greatest
power in the world at virtually no cost."62
Power notwithstanding, the transition period began much like
that after World War I with the Republican Party, ascendent in
the 1946 Congress, voicing a general public demand for industrial
and military demobilization. As a result there was a dramatic
cutback in both economic controls and the military establishment,
which in turn led to arguments over how to spend the second peace
dividend of the century. These arguments were resolved by
congressional approval of a major Republican tax cut that capped
domestic spending and forced even deeper cuts in an already
modest defense budget. Almost unheeded was the concern of the
Council of Economic Advisors that "a drastic reduction in public
outlays plus the rapid demobilization of our armed forces, would
lead to heavy unemployment and business dislocation for a
substantial period of time."63

The domestic background only highlighted the extraordinary
decision by the United States in the post-1945 transition period
to set aside the long and hallowed tradition defined by
Washington in his farewell address and accept the
responsibilities rejected after 1918. That decision, in fact,
came about almost external to American politics and economics, as
the government responded to the increasing Soviet threat by
filling the power vacuums created by World War II with economic
and military commitments.64 The result was what Stanley Hoffmann
has called "America's guasi-Immaculate Conception as a world
leader."65 Most great powers had "risen through the ranks" by
means of long apprenticeships of international involvement and
conflict. America, on the other hand, turned to world involvement
in the second transition period with all the notions, habits and
practices developed during a national existence focused on
separation from that world. Unlike Great Britain or the Soviet
Union, the United States became a global superpower almost
without training and preparation.
All this had important consequences. There was, for
instance, the natural inexperience of the tiny group of American
foreign policy and governmental elites. The world, contrary to
American belief, was not a tabula rasa; it was the United States
in terms of world involvement that was almost a tabula rasa.
Moreover, within these elites, there was a general feeling that
there must be no repetition of the interwar years' behavior. As a
result, there was an exhilarating sense of purpose that pervaded
the writings and actions of the so-called "Wise Men" and the
growing American "establishment"--a focus on global activism to
make up for the passivity of the past. And what better way to
compensate for the previous lack of understanding concerning a
great nation's need for power than for that establishment to turn
to the realist paradigm with a will. Having deserted the world
in 1919 and having failed it in the 1930s, these elites were
ready to combine a world role with adequate power and the will to
use it.66
That power, the American establishment quickly came to
realize, must be focused on the Soviet Union--a fact recognized
by George Kennan and incorporated in his strategic vision through
the realist prism for the management of power. Beginning with his
famous "long telegram" to the State Department from his Moscow
post in 1946 and continuing in the next year with speeches and
articles, Kennan outlined a vision squarely focused on the Soviet
threat. That threat was not going to go away, he emphasized,
because Soviet legitimacy was based on the fiction of an external
American menace. As a consequence, the United States must give up
idealistic visions such as making the world safe for democracy.
Instead, American efforts should be focused on creating a
balance-of-power world in order to contain Soviet expansionism
until such time as citizens throughout the USSR insisted on major
domestic reforms, thus moderating Soviet foreign policy. "The
United States has in its power," he elaborated in 1947,

to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet
policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far
greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it
has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to
promote tendencies which must eventually find their
outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing
of Soviet power.67
Despite the clarity of this approach within the realist
paradigm, the suddenness of U.S. involvement in world affairs, as
the domestic fight over the peace dividend indicated, would also
require the sense of mission that was firmly rooted in the
national ethos with linkage from Jefferson through Wilson to a
purveyor of the "American Century" like Henry Luce. "Because
America alone among the nations of the earth was founded on ideas
which transcend class and caste and racial and occupational
differences," Luce wrote in 1942, "America alone can provide the
pattern for the future."68 After 1945, reformist impulse
dominated the imperative to preserve the United States from
European "contamination," precisely because the latter had
prevailed in the first transition and the decades after with such
poor results. As a consequence, American enthusiasm in the second
transition was incorporated into a vision for the world with
origins not in intellectual dogma, as was the case with MarxistLeninism, but in an idealized conception of the American national
experience--a combination of political and moral beliefs.69
With this moralism and glorified history came an enormous
self-confidence that allowed Americans to see in the sudden
acquisition of great power both a reward for the virtues of their
national beliefs and purpose and a tool for spreading those
virtues. This perception marked a major difference between the
two transition periods. During the first period, the United
States became a key player because of involvement in a conflict
viewed as resulting from the sordid and squalid intrigues of
cabinet diplomacy. The second transition, on the other hand,
simply became with very little letup a continuation of the
American response to one ideological Leviathan, represented by
the Fascist repudiation of the Enlightenment, with the response
to another, also in the totalitarian mold, the Communist heresy.
The result was adoption by the Truman administration of Kennan's
sweeping realist vision of world order combined with an equally
sweeping vision of a world free from aggression, in which free
people could determine their own destinies with the help of the
United States. "I believe," President Truman declared in the
March 1947 doctrine named for him, "that it must be the policy of
the United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation. . . .I believe that we must assist free
people to work out their own destinies in their own way."70
This apparent open-ended commitment of ends would not be
matched by military means until the Korean conflict, long after
the cold war had begun. But the adoption of Kennan's strategic
vision concerning the Soviet threat was the turning point.

Because that threat became apparent so rapidly to governmental
elites and the American people, there really was very little time
for transition before the United States embarked on the cold war.
The goal of containment enshrined rhetorically in the Truman
Doctrine was reaffirmed by November 1948 in NSC 20/4 as the
overall national security objective, concluding that "Soviet
domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by
armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be
strategically and politically unacceptable to the United
States."71 Most important, because that threat was to endure for
over 40 years with varying degrees of intensity, global
management of power was frozen in a bipolar configuration of that
most fundamental concept of management systems in the realist
paradigm: balance of power.

CHAPTER 3
THE SUBORDINATE PARADIGMS
Men and women a century from now will very likely find
the Cold War as obscure and incomprehensible as we
today find the Thirty Years War. . . .
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.72
The very word "war" has become misleading. It would
probably be more accurate to say that by becoming
continuous, war has ceased to exist.
George Orwell, 1984
In 1947, like 1917 or 1940-41, the United States made a
decision to go to war because it was not in America's interest to
have Europe come under the domination of a single hostile power.
No one could anticipate how long that conflict would last; but
most agreed with the author of containment that an early
denouement in the nuclear era was neither likely nor desirable.
"I would rather wait thirty years for a defeat of the Kremlin
brought about by the tortuous and exasperatingly slow devices of
diplomacy," Kennan wrote in 1949, "than to see us submit to the
test of arms a difference so little susceptible to any clear and
happy settlement by those means."73 The result was a long drawnout twilight conflict in which a succession of U.S. cold war
administrations experimented with ways and means to achieve the
overall national security objective-- experimentation that
rendered the containment process less efficient than it might
have been. Nevertheless, that process was ultimately successful.
"The post-Cold War world resembles what the 'wise men' hoped the
world after 1945 would be," John Lewis Gaddis concluded in this
regard. "Containment was a long detour, but it did not, in the
end, prevent arrival at the intended destination."74
In looking back over the years consumed by that detour,
analysts have tended generally to view the cold war in two
different ways. McGeorge Bundy, not surprisingly, saw it as a
wartime era of danger and survival.75 And Arthur Schlesinger has
called it "this curious episode in modern history,. . .a long,
costly, dark, dreary, and dangerous affair," in which an old
fashioned geopolitical rivalry grew "into a holy war so intense
and obsessive as to threaten the very existence of human life on
the planet."76 On the other hand, there is another group that
views the cold war as a time of protracted stability. "The period
since 1945," one such proponent concluded, "arguably represents
the longest period of great-power peace since the birth of the
modern world system. . . ."77
Long war or long peace? "Change a name," Crane Brinton
observed in his seminal work on revolutions, "and you change the
thing."78 The notion of peace, of course, can describe an

enormous range of relationships from complete accord to outright
hostility just short of war. For instance, peace was used to
describe American relations with both Canada and the Soviet
Union, although the two relationships had very little in common.
War, on the other hand, can describe hostilities that fall short
of actual fighting or that have escalated into all-out total
conflict. America and the Soviet Union have never been formally
at war, even during the Russian Civil War when the United States
intervened with troops in western Russia and Siberia.
Nevertheless, each side after 1947 used force, normally through
subversion or surrogates, to challenge the other's interests.79
Considerations of the cold war as either a "long peace" or a
"long war" form two different subordinate paradigms from which to
examine and draw lessons for the future effectiveness of the
overall realist framework in the post-cold war era. The major
question in using these two paradigms concerns the levels of
analysis. Certainly, as David Singer noted as early as 1961, this
is a key problem in the study of international relations.80
Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 Theory of International Politics
focused on the level of the structure of the international
system in a study much admired for its parsimonious approach in a
field in which analytic variables abound.81 Some critics
complained that this focus on only one level of analysis failed
to account for change.82 Others pointed out that the state and
the individual were important levels of analysis that should not
be disregarded and that in fact over time could modify systemic
structures.83 In an earlier work, in fact, Waltz examined the
causes of war under three analytical headings or images: "within
man, within the structure of the separate states, within the
state system."84 These levels of analysis, he pointed out, were
fundamentally interrelated.
The partial quality of each image sets up a tension
that drives one toward inclusion of the others. With
the first image the direction of change. . .is from men
to societies and states. The second image catches up
both elements. Men make states and states make men; but
this is still a limited view. . .for states are shaped
by the international environment as are men by both the
national and international environments.85
This relationship is shown by the arrows in Figure 1.
The figure also illustrates the approach to what is
essentially a first cut at examining the impact of the cold war
on the United States at these three levels from the perspective
of that twilight conflict, first as a "long peace" and then as a
"long war." At the first level of "man," the general focus is on
the American public, particularly in terms of attitudes toward
national security formed during the cold war. At the "state"
level, the focus is on the evolution of the structure of the U.S.
Government--an evolution affected directly by the cold war and
indirectly by the effects of that war in terms of the first

image, the American public. Finally, there is the "international
system" and the implications of that system's transformation
during the cold war for the United States and its citizens.
Man.

War and the Use of Force. For the average American citizen
who lived through the cold war, the term "long peace" might seem
to stretch the phrase to its semantic limit. Certainly, from the
"long war" perspective, the cold war was, in fact, an often
violent conflict that endured because of the evolution of two
critically and associated rules of international behavior: no use
of nuclear weapons anywhere and anytime and no direct U.S.-Soviet

military conflict. The maintenance of these two rules throughout
the long twilight war was certainly no mean achievement, although
hardly what Kant envisioned in describing perpetual peace.
Those rules, however, were not self-apparent when examined
through the prism of the cold war as a "long war." It was all
very well for a Bernard Brodie to conclude that regardless of
culture or overall military strength, the possession of nuclear
weapons rendered impossible the Clausewitzian concept of war as
an extension of policy. But unlike earlier military technological
breakthroughs, the full consequences of using the atomic bomb
became apparent at Hiroshima just when the American people became
aware of the new weapon's existence. The invention of the machine
gun, for instance, inspired no concomitant vision of the horrific
slaughter of the Somme; nor did that of poison gas reflect an
appreciation of the effect produced by the first dusty, lethal
cloud at Ypres.86
The result after 1945 was a general perception of a
pervasive threat that was reflected not only in public support of
governmental programs such as those dealing with bomb shelters,
but in a more lasting form through the popular culture. Movies in
the Eisenhower years of massive retaliation, for instance, often
were concerned with atomic mutants such as giant ants in "Them"
or "The Fifty Foot Woman." And audiences were able to muster at
least nervous laughter several years after the Cuban missile
crisis in response to Stanley Kubrick's savage film, "Dr.
Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,"
which concludes with the destruction of the world by atomic
explosions backed by a sound track of Vera Lynn singing her World
War II hit: "We'll meet again, don't know where, don't know when.
. . ."87 That this public perception continued to play an
important role in the long war was illustrated by the phenomenal
success of the ABC movie, "The Day After," in the 1970s.
Viewed from the paradigm of the "long peace," however, this
bipolar culture took on a more optimistic outlook.88 The basic
assumption of containment, after all, was that it is sometimes
better to learn to live with adversaries than to attempt to
destroy them. Added to this was a perception of how irrationally
close the bipolar peace had come to being broken during the
crises over Quemoy and Matsu and, more seriously, over the Soviet
missiles in Cuba. The result was public support in the last
decades of the cold war for arms control negotiations and the
establishment of crisis management tools such as the "hot line"
between the two superpowers.89
There was, as a consequence of all this, a reinforcing
effect between the two paradigms in terms of the American
public's attitude toward war. Certainly, there was no return to
the earlier intellectual approach that equated war with progress.
Only Harry Lime, the villainous third man in the film of that
title, could be allowed the speech he delivers on the great wheel
at the Prater in Vienna, when he advises his friend not to be so

disapproving of his illegal activities:
After all, it's not that awful--you know what the
fellow said . . .In Italy for thirty years under the
Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed-they produced Michaelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the
Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love,
five hundred years of democracy and peace, and what did
that produce . . .? The cuckoo clock.90
Equally important, the paradigms reinforced a general
perception concerning what John Mueller has described as the
"obsolescence" of great power war. Mueller argued, however, that
the near-term effects of the nuclear technology had been confused
with a long-term trend toward ending great power conflict, caused
in part by the public reaction to two world wars. Nevertheless,
when viewed from either paradigm, it is hard to deny that, at the
very least, nuclear weapons have reinforced at all three levels
of analysis a tendency on the part of the great powers not to
fight each other. "These new technologies of war," Carl Kaysen
pointed out, "have amplified the message of this century's war
experiences by many decibels, and set it firmly in the minds of
the wide public as well as those of political and military
leaders."91 How firmly that message has been received was
illustrated in 1987 when the entertainer, Michael Feinstein, was
performing a series of songs by Irving Berlin in the Oak Room of
the Algonguin Hotel in New York City. As he rendered the 1911 hit
"Alexander's Ragtime Band," Feinstein stopped on the line that
explains the way the band plays a bugle call is "so natural that
you want to go to war," struck by the anachronistic sentiment.
"It's an old song," he remarked.92
There was another important reinforcement between the two
paradigms that affected the American public's perception of power
and force. In order to maintain a long war in peacetime, there
had to be an extended perception of national mobilization. Other
great powers in history had mobilized their military and economic
resources, while leaving foreign policy generally to the
diplomats and soldiers. But only in totalitarian societies have
popular energies been mobilized for protracted external actions.
The United States took an original approach to the problem. The
result, on the one hand, was a kind of mental mobilization that
went well beyond the limits of the military and foreign policy
experts. On the other hand, much of civilian life was largely
untouched by the great struggle abroad.93
The exceptions were the limited wars on the periphery in
Korea and Vietnam, both of which resulted from the peace in war
redundancy of the two paradigms focused on the overall bipolar
confrontation at the center. Vietnam taught the American public
the limits of military power by demonstrating not so much the
cost of committing aggression, as the cost of resisting it. At
the same time, the economic rise of Germany and Japan in sharp
contrast to the ruinous "guns and butter" efforts of the United

States added to the sophistication of the average American
concerning the concept of power. Most important, the Vietnam
conflict demonstrated to the public, ironically in America's
longest hot war, that struggles on the periphery, just because
they could take place without disturbing the "long peace," were
not necessary to prosecute the "long war." Credibility, in other
words, was no longer sufficient as an interest in itself when the
cost in blood and material was so apparent. "To leave Vietnam to
its fate," President Johnson vainly pointed out, "would shake
the confidence. . . in the value of the American commitment, the
value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and
instability, and even wider war."94

National Security and the Global Role. From a "long war"
perspective, the Soviet threat was the basis for a 40-year
strategic consensus by the American people, providing the United
States, in Ronald Steel's description, "with a global
vocation."95 On the geopolitical side, there was a growing public
perception, as Hans Morgenthau pointed out, of a "worldwide
balance of which the United States and the Soviet Union are the
main weights, placed on opposite scales. . . ." Within that
framework, other regions had "become functions of the new
worldwide balance, mere 'theaters' where the power context
between the two great protagonists is fought out."96
Ideologically by 1950, the American people were becoming
accustomed to the framework of a "long war" waged in a Manichean
struggle against a pervasive global and evil empire and reflected
officially that year in NSC-68:
What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the
polarization of power which now inescapably confronts
[a] slave society with the free. . . .The assault. .
.is world wide, and in the context of the present
polarization of power a defeat. . .anywhere is a defeat
everywhere. . . .97
This overall strategic consensus meant that for the first
time in their nation's history, Americans perceived an enduring
national security role outside U.S. borders. In the context of
the "long war," the public and governmental elites began to think
of a security system as one that functioned from day to day.
Reliable peace in that paradigm was nonexistent, which in turn
led to a clarity of alignments and planning against identified
threats. The result was a system for an insecure world that
included the emergence of NATO and other multilateral regional
alliances, growing defense budgets, large "peacetime" military
forces, and episodic combat in the Third World.
Equally important, the "long war" accustomed the public to
global leadership while at the same time imparting the virtues of
patience and cooperation. The fact that the nuclear weapon had
only a deterrent role that was lacking any positive productivity
meant that Americans grew used to a protracted struggle without a
clearly defined end. Concomittantly, there evolved a much greater

general appreciation of the intractability of many issues.
Certainly, the establishment of "rules of the game" between the
two powers, despite the ideological chasm separating them, was an
important manifestation of this development. Equally significant,
the American tendency to "solutionism" gave way generally in the
public mind over the decades of the "long war" to a realization
of the need, in an expression often used by Francois Mitterrand,
to "give time to time."98
But time in the context of the "long war" also meant money
to the American taxpayer. And massive amounts expended in pursuit
of absolute security, as George Kennan and President Eisenhower
were the first to realize, could actually prevent the achievement
of that goal in terms of economic damage to American society. In
this regard, the "long war" demonstrated that the American people
were not willing to support "risk minimizing" strategies in
national security affairs, because such strategies tended to
drive up costs even while they attempted to provide insurance
against a wide spectrum of potential threats. From this
perspective, nuclear weapons were particularly important since
they provided at key points in the cold war (1945-50, 1953-61,
and less overtly, 1969-80) a means to minimize costs by paying
with some increase of risk. Without those weapons, the defense
establishment and the underlying foundations of the Military
Industrial Complex might have been much larger than they were
during the "long war." As a result, there might have been public
revulsion to such massive costs, producing isolationism and
abrogation of global responsibilities reminiscent of the 1920s.99
The aspect of cost in terms of national security was
reinforced for the American public by the Vietnam experience in
the context of the "long peace" paradigm, since it represented
such a protracted and increasingly forceful break for the United
States within that framework. The "guns and butter" economy
produced in that "limited" war, for instance, set in train many
of the social and economic problems that would cause the American
people to broaden their definition of national security affairs
in the following decades to include domestic as well as foreign
policy. Moreover, as the bipolar struggle began to fade into the
shade of detente and into an increasingly dominant "long peace"
framework in the wake of Vietnam, the sense of purpose and
direction that had permeated the mobilization of minds and
energies in a national consensus began to dissipate. The result
was an adverse synergism combining the decline of both a common
doctrine and a common enemy, which produced in turn a massive
void for a nation used to perceiving global politics as crusades
to save humanity from an overwhelming bully. The consequent
strategic uncertainties demonstrated in the revamped containment
policies of the Carter and Reagan years spilled over into
America's third great transition of this century.100
Those uncertainties were reinforced by a growing "declinist"
view directly tied to the "long war" paradigm and represented in
the national debates generated by the 1987 publication of Paul

Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.101 From the
standpoint of the public with its general sense of American
exceptionalism, nothing appeared quite so disturbing as the
declinist assertions that the United States might soon share the
"fall" common to every hegemon of the past. Nor was the blow
softened by a growing realization, reflected in the debates, that
the successful development of American political institutions and
economic systems in the major axis powers of World War II might
well play a major role in that decline. The result was ironical
from the perspective of either paradigm, with the idea of a more
modest future being generally rejected by the public at the same
time that a disposition not to pay for America's position in the
world was increasing in the Reagan years.102
By that time, in any event, the American public was ready to
jettison the "long war." This was due, in part, to the fatigue
factor associated with that particular framework. Moreover, there
was the hope of improved relations with the Soviet Union as
Gorbachev's initiatives began to take effect, coupled with the
growing awareness of American domestic problems, also generally
perceived as an outcome of the "long war." Opinion polls
indicated that from 1985 on, the nation increasingly was
convinced of the need to turn from that "war" and focus on
domestic issues, which were perceived more and more as the major
threat to U.S. national security. This readiness of the public to
turn inward occurred long before the national mood began to sour,
frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the political system.103
The lessons and habits from the extended global role in the
"long war" are also reflected in the same opinion polls, which
demonstrate that the public desire to focus on urgent domestic
concerns is predicated on a firm commitment to internationalism:
a general conviction on the part of the majority of Americans in
the current transition that, in terms of national security, the
United States "must take an active part in world affairs."104 The
result is a thoughtful and stable commitment to internationalism
that, as one prominent pollster has pointed out, "is one of a
handfull of issues about which citizens have carefully considered
the consequences of their views and have come to accept
responsibility for them--the defining characteristic of mature
public judgment."105
Nevertheless, the sense of limitations acquired from the
perspectives of both paradigms will color the public's perception
of that commitment. In the Third World, early American hopes for
speedy economic development based on the U.S. national experience
have been replaced by resigned pragmatism tinged with
disappointment. In addition, there are the lessons concerning the
limitations of military power, no matter how massive, that
resulted from violent interruptions of the "long peace" ranging
from Vietnam to Lebanon. Moreover, the mixed results from
attempts to devise sweeping human rights doctrines and
nonproliferation policies are reminders that what finds favor in
American eyes is not always so obvious to other nations. Finally,

as both the coalitions of the "long war" and the growing economic
linkages of the "long peace" demonstrated to the American people,
U.S. global leadership must be provided in a multilateral
context.106
In terms of national security, this multilateral focus is
most understandable in the "long war" context. In this regard,
enthusiasm for some form of collective security has emerged in
the current transition just as it did in 1918 and 1945, because
the end of an epochal conflict gives peace the air of normalcy.
But after two generations of the "long war," the American public
still remains psychologically disposed to think of a security
system operating on a daily basis, focused on a specific threat.
At the same time, the apparent victory of liberalism provides a
renewed appeal to the idea of collective security, a concept in
its idealized form that is oriented on general, nonspecific,
abstract threats to security. The answer may lie with the United
Nations, about which the public is still ambivilant, particularly
if it considers the relatively minor role of that organization in
the post-1945 era when viewed from either paradigm. Nevertheless,
as opinion polls indicate, there is a latent willingness to
support a growing role for the United Nations:
If Americans do not want the United States to do the
job unilaterally--yet feel some responsibility for
indeed getting it done-- the United Nations is the most
credible candidate for the task. Americans are willing
to be sold on this proposition, to have their questions
and resistances addressed, and their enthusiasm
sparked. This will not happen spontaneously. It will
require active leadership. The potential nonetheless
exists, if America's leaders wish to take advantage of
it.107
All this means that governmental elites will have to work
harder in the current transition period to build a strategic
consensus among the American people concerning the increasingly
more complex concept of national security. The task is made
easier because of both paradigms. Patience, perserverence and
endurance in the face of protracted conflict without prospects of
clear victory is assuredly a lesson of the "long war." On the
other hand, the "long peace" demonstrated that absence of
conflict does not necessarily mean tranquility, certainty, or
predictability. The cold war showed at times that it can also
mean chaos, uncertainty and unpredictability. As a result, there
is a growing awareness on the part of the American people that
the United States faces a situation in the post-cold war
transition period similar to that which, in Edward Luttwak's
description, confronted the Roman Empire in its later stages:
The Romans did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed
group of enemies, whose ultimate defeat would ensure
permanent security. Regardless of the amplitude of
Roman victories, the frontiers of the empire would

always remain under attack, since they were barriers in
the path of secular migration flows from north to
south and from east to west. Hence Roman strategy
could not usefully aim at total victory at any cost,
for the threat was not temporary but endless. The only
rational goal was the maintenance of a minimally
adequate level of security at the lowest feasible
cost.108

Change and Continuity. From the "long war" perspective,
there was an enduring ideological high for the American people,
who generally came to regard the Soviet Union during much of the
cold war as a conspiracy disguised as a state. President Wilson
had helped create this aspect of U.S. foreign policy by
presenting the American entry into World War I as a great crusade
that would make the world "safe for democracy," with its tacit
assumption that Germany was the enemy because it was undemocratic
and thus autocratic. And when he incorporated that assumption in
the demand contained in the Fourteen Points for the overthrow of
the Hohenzollern Monarchy, he created an enduring association for
the American people between the form and the behavior of
governments. That linkage resurfaced after 1945, resulting in an
official U.S. position throughout much of the cold war that
adherence to Marxist-Leninism produced governments that were not
only internally repressive, but through their presumed
subordination to Moscow, a threat to the global balance of power
as well.109
Most important for continued American public support of the
"long war," the linkage was also made specifically with the
proselytizing of U.S. values and methods. As the Truman Doctrine
demonstrated, the geopolitical reality was never stronger than
when it coincided at the ideological level with the defense of
freedom and the diffusion of such American virtues as freedom of
speech, belief and enterprise. Without such underlying idealism,
the post-1945 transition might have occurred more slowly or not
at all. For if the American people were to embark on a "long war"
with no clearly defined end, it was essential for government
leaders to appeal to a tradition as long as the Republic's
existence in which, as Thomas Jefferson had described it, the
United States was to be "a standing monument and example for the
aim and imitation of other countries."110 It was this "city on the
hill" tradition that accounted for the American reaction even
from the "long war" perspective to such revelations as the power
politics of the Yalta Conference, the espionage of the U-2
incident, or the covert action of the Bay of Pigs.
It is this tradition in the current transition that
accounted for the attempts by the Bush administration to maintain
the cold war equation between particularist security and
universalist freedom as the basis for consensus in the Persian
Gulf conflict. The result was that the vital U.S. interest of
unimpeded access to Persian Gulf oil was subsumed in a
resurrection of the "Munich lesson" that aggression anywhere if

not stopped would endanger world order and thus American
security. This was an approach much more satisfying to the
American people, but bound to lead to confusion, as the U.S.
reaction to aggression in Bosnia has demonstrated. Moreover, this
idealism is still tied to the sense of American exceptionalism
that was reinforced by the course and outcome of the long war.
The problem, as Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out, is that this
tendency is not suited for America's third transition period:
It is dangerous. . .to believe in a kind of moral
uniqueness or superiority (whose other side, when
things turn out badly, is a tendency to blame one-self
for all the world's ills, which is just as absurd as
the belief that one is predestined and morally fit to
cure them), in a special role either as the world's
policeman or as the propagator of human rights,
especially when the deference of others is shrinking,
when the contrast between such ambitions and domestic
achievements is glaring and when the direction of
'Manifest Destiny' is anything but manifest.111
The current transition also reflects other aspects
concerning the American public revealed by the two paradigms.
From a "long war" perspective, the growth of the national
security state made that public increasingly aware of defense
costs. This was accentuated when viewed through the "long peace"
framework by the expansion of other governmental programs, which
only raised public perceptions that those programs were generally
diminished by defense needs. The result has been public
expectations of a peace dividend not unlike those in the previous
two transition periods.
At the same time, both paradigms reveal, however
speculatively, an adverse confluence of trends. From a "long war"
perspective, there are the buildup of tensions over the decades
and the concomitant "live for the moment" approach that dovetail
with the materialism viewed through the "long peace" paradigm.
These offer disturbing comparisons with the self-indulgent
decades at the end of the extended peace terminated by World War
I. From both perspectives, there is the popular culture dominated
by selfishness and short-sightedness and the tendency to put
personal wishes and demands ahead of societal obligations. A
concomitant to this is what John Lewis Gaddis calls "a curious
unevenness in the willingness to bear pain."112 In this regard,
the United States has been generous, even profligate with its
military forces, but almost irresponsibly selfish in terms of
issues affecting lifestyle and pocket book.
Once again, both paradigms are instructive, since this last
tendency goes back at least to President Johnson's peace in war
refusal to ask for sacrifices in the American home front during
the Vietnam war even as he built up the "guns and butter" economy
to service both that conflict and the "Great Society." Moreover,
as the "long war" declined in the 1980s and with it the public

consensus, President Reagan attempted to restore his domestic
basis by convincing the American people that the United States
might aspire to great ends without enduring hardships in
conjuring up the means. In the end, as Robert Tucker has pointed
out, the Reagan years "transformed what had been a disposition
not to pay for the American position in the world into something
close to a fixed resolve not to do so."113
In the wake of the cold war, the American people generally
perceive the U.S. Government as a bloated and incompetent
gridlocked manifestation of both the "long war" and the "long
peace." "Nowadays," George Will has pointed out, "government
looks to most Americans like an overbearing and overreaching
underachiever that is suspect regarding both its competence and
motives."114 Paradoxically, this collapse of the prestige of
government comes just as the American people, increasingly
sophisticated in their approach to both the domestic and
international aspects of national security, desire more
leadership. That leadership, however, will have to develop in
this third transition period within a vastly constrained
environment, reminiscent more of the first rather than the second
transition, if it is to be effective in calling forth sufficient
effort and sacrifice by the American people.
State.

The National Security State. Ernest May has described what
happens when form and function grow apart in capitals of nationstates as a result of historical change:
In Westminster, the houses of Parliament and Buckingham
Palace--both structures of the Victorian era--and the
Georgian and Regency offices along Whitehall are
buildings for a seat of empire, not for the capital of
a middle-ranking member of the European Community. The
drab, modest government office blocks of Tokyo and Bonn
seem equally ill-suited, given that they serve the
second and third ranking powers of the economic world.
None of these capitals vies with Vienna, where the
magnificent Hofburg is the seat of government for a
republic smaller than Indiana. . . .115
The "long war" caused a militarization of the U.S.
Government that to some extent has produced a similar mismatch
between form and function in the current transition period. Only
in the context of the "long war" is it possible to understand why
power, money, prestige and public influence were conferred on old
and new agencies oriented on the Soviet threat and the people who
ran them. The result is a vast national security apparatus. In
terms of the Executive Branch, that apparatus stretches from the
Old Executive Office Building next to the White House, to the
plain new State Department Building on 21st Street, across the
Potomac to the Pentagon where over 25,000 workers man the tip of

the defense iceberg, to the Central Intelligence Agency further
out in Virginia. On Capitol Hill, the members of Congress and
their staffs work on myriad committees that oversee the military,
intelligence and diplomatic establishments dealing with national
security. Finally, outside the government, there is another set
of interested participants ranging from arms manufacturers,
politicians, and professors, to publicists, pontificators and
demagogues, who also invested careers and fortunes in the "long
war."116
The evolution of a post-World War II government with
national security concerns dominant and a military establishment
transcendent was not preordained. In fact, the major focus in the
global arena after 1945 was primarily on economics as the United
States began its familiar postwar pattern of demobilization. So
rapid was the pace that one month after the end of the war, the
Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported that "a year or more
would be required to reconstitute our military position at a
fraction of its recent power."117 As a result of that pattern,
there was increasingly acrimonious competition among the
services. The 1947 National Security Act settled little in this
regard, particularly when President Truman began to cut military
spending back to an avowed goal of the 1938 level. Even the Key
West meeting the following year that hammered out service
functions failed to stop interservice bickering and rivalry.
Despite those agreements, for instance, the Navy lunged
immediately for a part of the strategic bombing role, setting off
the so-called 1949 "Revolt of the Admirals," which soon spilled
over in unseemly fashion into Congress and thus to the American
people.118
By that time, the focus of the government had shifted to the
military, primarily because of a series of crises, famous in the
litany of early cold war events. Moreover, the best allied
intelligence available indicated a large Soviet buildup that
included by 1950, 175 divisions, several hundred new bombers
capable of striking any part of the Mediterranean or the British
isles, large and improving tactical air forces, and over 300
submarines capable of extended underwater operations in the
Atlantic. Added to this were the two seminal events of 1949: the
explosion of a Soviet nuclear device and the victory of the
People's Republic of China in the Chinese Civil War. The result
in the spring of 1950 was NSC-68 which called for a substantial
increase in military forces--all unlikely to have been achieved
if not for the Korean War, which seemed to bear out the principal
assumptions of the document. Because of that conflict,
congressional leaders in a groundswell of bipartisan support
joined President Truman in massively increasing the permanent
American military establishment in order to prepare the country
for an indefinite "period of acute danger."119
The transformation of the American government occurred
rapidly thereafter. In FY 50, the military budget accounted for
less than one-third of government expenditures and less than 5

percent of GNP--much of that due to residual World War II
obligations. By FY 53, the military represented more than 60
percent of the government outlays and more than 12 percent of
GNP. In the years ahead, despite a downward trend in military
spending when compared to a more rapidly rising GNP, the military
establishment that emerged from the Korean War remained the
dominant consumer of governmental discretionary funds. At the
same time, defense and defense-related agencies employed for much
of the "long war" between 60 and 70 percent of all Federal
personnel.120
1950 was also a dividing line for diplomacy. For even from a
"long peace" perspective, the State Department after that year
also shifted its focus more and more to military security. As a
consequence, American Secretaries of State spent an increasing
amount of time in the ensuing decades on issues concerning levels
of and arrangements for forward deployed U.S. military forces;
amounts of military aid authorized for client states; and, in
the last half of the cold war, arrangements for nuclear arms
control.121
There were similar developments at the White House in terms
of increasing structure and organizational precedence oriented on
political-military issues, primarily through the development of
the National Security Council (NSC). In the early Truman years,
that organization was merely one part of the Executive Office of
the President, only sparingly used by the Chief Executive. After
1950, the NSC became the government's principal steering
mechanism, with real decisionmaking invariably involving the
assistants to the president for national security affairs. That
post increased exponentially in importance during the Kennedy
administration, reaching new peaks in the Nixon and Carter years
when the national security advisers often brushed aside the
secretaries of state. By the end of the "long war," the business
hours of the presidents were occupied primarily with the problems
vetted and brought to them by means of the NSC system. And in
fact, as Ernest May has pointed out, by that time "the main
business of the United States government had become the
development, maintenance, positioning, exploitation, and
regulation of military forces."122

The Change in Government. Walter Lippmann early on foresaw
the growth of collectivism brought on by the economic problems of
the Great Depression which were forcing governments to replace
the market place as arbiter of international and national
economic relations. Those pressures, he concluded during the
Depression, "will enormously increase the scope of government and
greatly intensify the dependence of the individual upon
government."123 In this, he was partially correct. It is true, of
course, that welfare and social security payments as well as
guaranteed price supports for farmers emerged in the 1930s in
response to the Great Depression. But because those programs only
benefited minorities at the expense of the public majority, they
could not command universal support or reach as large a scale as

defense expenditures would in response to the "long war."124
It was in the context of the "long war" paradigm that
military outlays came to provide a major impetus for the
increased role of the American government in redistributing
economic resources among the citizenry. It was also in that
context that those outlays came to be perceived as serving the
common good. As a consequence, there was never concerted
opposition to the special interests concerned with contracts for
new military weapons and equipment that emerged and grew over the
decades. Military expenditures thus increased steadily in
response to the needs of the "long war," with governmental
purchases of arms from a "long peace" perspective becoming, in
William McNeil's phrase, "a stabilizing flywheel for the American
economy."125 The result was a peacetime economy generally immune
to business cycles, because the demand and production of weaponry
and equipment came over the life of the cold war to be governed
by political not financial considerations.
It was in this sense that the arms race with the Soviet
Union allowed in diluted form and with very little break the
continuation of the deliberate management of the American economy
that had worked so well in World War II when arms production
finally eliminated the Great Depression. The exigencies of that
conflict required such drastic and unpopular political
intervention in the market place as rationing. In the "long war,"
however, it was enough to exert softer political management
focused on arms expenditure and the deliberate manipulation of
tax and interest rates to sustain a protracted era of prosperity.
During that era, when viewed from a "long peace" perspective, it
was also the generally rising standard of living that diminished
complaints about growing welfare expenditures and farm subsidies,
thus contributing to the smooth functioning of the American
economy. In the end, both paradigms are essential to understand
the primary stimulus for the remarkable political management of
the U.S. economy throughout the cold war and how without that
combination of peace in war, a different basis for American
prosperity would certainly have evolved, as it did for Germany
and Japan.
The paradigms play a similar role in examining the evolution
of governmental politics and the political culture. From the
"long war" perspective, for instance, the overall strategic
consensus concerning containment made possible a degree of
presidential hegemony, previously only achieved in external or
civil war. The rise of the imperial presidency backed by the
Supreme Court would last as long as Congress was willing to fall
patriotically in line with the Chief Executive's strategic
priorities and his budgetary requests. Above all, there were the
actions designed to provide more freedom of maneuver, ranging
from the use of executive agreements to the crafting of
resolutions beginning in the Eisenhower administration that coopted Congress into approving unspecified presidential moves in
advance--a development that reached its logical denouement in the

wake of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
From the standpoint of both paradigms, the second and most
prolonged American encounter with the complex concept of limited
war explains the decline of this executive dominance. To begin
with, limited war theorists had generally seen such conflicts as
antiseptic encounters, primarily political in nature and thus
manageable as part of the "long peace." The logical concomitants
to such an approach were the lack of relevance of military
considerations and the unimportance of domestic politics, both of
which were prescriptions for ultimate disaster in Vietnam. The
former led to the use of military actions primarily in the
political sense of "signalling" which in turn had the more
pernicious effect of gradualism. The fallacy of the latter belief
was exposed by the combination of that gradualism with the
communication revolution which brought the increasing human cost
of the war to the American people on a daily basis. Ultimately,
limited war in Vietnam failed because the chief executives of the
United States could not convince their citizens that such a
savage break in the "long peace" could serve the overall
objectives of the "long war."126
As a result, Congress began to reassert its authority in
foreign affairs, particularly in the matter of war powers,
understandably the most contentious issue when viewed through the
combined prism of the two paradigms. In the wake of the cold war,
the balancing mechanisms built into the Constitution have
returned, functioning as they were originally intended. On the
other hand, the strategic consensus that provided the presidency
with so much power during the "long war" has disappeared. And
although that consensus was directed externally, the increased
linkage of foreign policy with domestic policy in terms of
national security affairs has generated a perception of general
executive-legislative gridlock by a public grown accustomed to
over four decades of the imperial presidency.

Change and Continuity. From the "long war" perspective, the
militarization of the American government made eminent sense as a
creative response to unprecedented challenges. Given the
pervasive Soviet military threat and the rapid evolvement of
nuclear and other military technologies against the enduring
backdrop of widespread global insecurities, the consequences for
the world would have been much different if the United States had
not structured itself to deal primarily with military issues.
Certainly in terms of international stability, an American
government organized to emphasize domestic or international
economic affairs could hardly have acted, for example, as a
credible foundation to build a collective defense structure like
NATO. Nevertheless, the "long war" has left the United States
with a government that will be increasingly ill-suited for the
new era. The NSC, for instance, is hardly the mechanism for
formulating policy options dealing with the environment, trade,
population, hunger, or disease. And both the defense and
intelligence establishments ultimately will have to make changes

and reorganizations as the post-cold war world emerges.
No one expects Washington to return to the Cincinnatian
capital of the 1930s in which the State, War, and Navy
departments were all housed in what is now the Old Executive
Office Building. At the same time, however, there is the clear
necessity to design new institutions for the new era. In the
previous transition period, the task was easier since the United
States had so little international affairs machinery and
experience, and thus could build from a fresh base that allowed
its newly emerging policy elites to be "present at the creation."
There is, to say the least, no comparable void in Washington
during the current transition. Moreover, the emphasis on national
security during the "long war" has left the departments that
manage domestic affairs as largely moribund, somewhat upgraded
spinoffs of New Deal agencies. Infusing new life into the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Interior
will also be a major task in the new era as will transforming the
Department of Energy from its status as a barely remodeled Atomic
Energy Commission.127
The economic choices will be no easier for the United States
in the current transition period, particularly if the post-1945
era is viewed through the "long war" paradigm. From that
perspective, the cold war is a reminder that America has hardly
ever demonstrated in this century a capacity to resolve key
economic problems in peacetime. Defense spending in both World
Wars as well as throughout most of the cold war stabilized the
economy at crucial moments. In fact, except for the exuberant
thrust of the "roaring twenties," a period that contained the
seeds of the Great Depression, the American economy has not
prospered for an extended length of time in the 20th century
except in periods of war.128
A major problem in all this emerges from the combination of
the two paradigms. Belligerent states usually aim to return to
peace through victory or compromise and as a consequence make
plans both for reconverting their economies and for shaping the
post-war order. But the "long peace" accustomed two generations
of statesmen to a reversal of Clausewitz's dictum, with politics
becoming a method of conducting war by other means. As a result,
the United States was not prepared for "victory."129
From the "long war" perspective, that lack of preparedness
was reflected in the actions of the Reagan administration to
postpone the full economic impact of the decline in military
spending as a percent of GNP that accompanied the winding down of
the cold war. To begin with, the government simply increased
military spending, while devaluing the dollar in an attempt to
stimulate exports. Finally, the administration used tax cuts and
extreme deficits to stimulate the economy. The economic problems
that ultimately ensued and have spilled over into the current
transition are not ones generally faced by the American
government during the full flush of military Keynesianism in the

"long war." The result is a political system that appears
fundamentally stalemated in its approach to economic issues.130
The basic problem in the current transition period is one of
choices concerning the reallocation of resources without causing
large-scale disruption and unemployment. Political consensus will
be extremely difficult, particularly for expenditures that
benefit some segments of society more than others. And yet there
is no going back, no real choice that can undo the government
intervention in the exchange of goods and services that has
affected the daily life of the American people in a unique peacein-war environment for over two generations. It is up to the
government, then, to create some new balance among all the
special interests and social groupings in American society. That,
in turn, will call for a political process much like the one that
redefined the role of the Federal government in the last
transition period. At that time, the domestic impact of foreign
aid and rearmament was submerged in the debate over what the
United States was required to do overseas to contain communism.
Government elites in the current transition will have to focus on
domestic policy while tempering without relinquishing American
global involvement brought on by a 40-year "war," the very
duration of which was legitimized through the prism of the "long
peace."131
An important aspect of that global involvement has to do
with change and continuity in the American military. In terms of
the "long war" perspective, the most striking result of events
after 1945 was the emergence of a huge standing military force
which ultimately provided the United States a balanced global
reach unlike that of any great power in history. The current
joint air, land, sea effectiveness of American forces, for
instance, stands in sharp contrast to the situation at the zenith
of the Royal Navy's rule of the sea under the Pax Britannica,
when Bismarck noted that if the British army should land on the
coast of Prussia, he would have the local police arrest it. The
vastness of the force required for preserving the "long peace"
while prosecuting the "long war" on a global scale was captured
by Zbignew Brzezinski at the height of the cold war when he noted
that there were:
more than a million American troops stationed on some
400 major and almost 300 minor United States military
bases scattered all over the globe. [There were] more
than forty-two nations tied to the United States by
security pacts, American military missions training
the officers and troops of many other national armies,
and the approximately two hundred thousand United
States civilian government employees in foreign posts
all makes for striking analogies to the great classical
imperial systems.132
All that has changed with the end of the cold war.
Downsizing is a fact of life for the U.S. military in this

transition period as it was from the wartime perspective after
the other two great conflicts of this century. The principal
reason, like that at the conclusion of any war, is that the
overarching threat has virtually disappeared. But in vanquishing
that threat, the American public and governmental elites have
come to realize that changes had occurred in the military element
of power as well. As a conflict extended within the "long peace,"
the cold war prolonged the traditional view of national security
as a predominantly military matter, even as a changing world both
at home and abroad demanded a more sophisticated, eclectic
approach.
Part of the change had to do with the erosion of the 500year old linkage between military and economic strength, the
"self-reinforcing cycle," in William McNeil's words, as a
symbiotic means of producing predominance in world politics.133 By
the 1980s, there was a general perception that there was a price
to pay for emphasizing military security over solvency, that the
40-year quest for military advantages from the wartime
perspective had done nothing to protect the United States from
economic decline and social disequilibrium within the extended
peace paradigm, and in fact in many cases had exacerbated those
problems. That perception was reinforced by the massive
economically-induced implosion of the Soviet Union that ended the
cold war. Added to that was the recognition that the "long war"
for both superpowers had truly been a "long peace" for Germany
and Japan, precisely because, like the tiny nation in the film,
"The Mouse that Roared," their defeat in war had allowed them to
separate economic growth from military capability.134
The major problem remaining for the U.S. military in the
current transition period is to incorporate these changes in such
a way as to make rational the traditional post-war American
pattern of demobilization. From the perspectives of both
paradigms, the Department of Defense (DOD) is vastly more
prepared to do this than in 1947. Thanks to reforms ranging from
National Security Act amendments to the Goldwater-Nichols Act,
DOD has evolved into a sophisticated, coherent entity in terms of
both directing war and coordinating with the myriad government
agencies concerned with national security. Nevertheless, there
are some formidable challenges.
In the first place, as Senator Nunn has pointed out, the
transition should not produce merely a smaller copy of the cold
war force, replete with miniaturized versions of the
inefficiencies and redundancies that emerged over the decades
since the service roles and missions were created in the Key West
conference of 1948. It will require a delicate balance. On the
one hand, there is the need to reduce the duplication and
redundancy of forces and weapons in order to have an affordable
military capable of performing strategic and operational
missions. On the other hand, as a matter of operational surety,
some redundancy has a genuine place in the national military
strategy if flexibility and combat survivability are not to be

severely reduced. What does not have a place if congressional and
public support for the downsizing military is to be maintained
are the protectionism and interservice territoriality that marked
the last transition. In the CNN age, a public in search of peace
dividends will simply not tolerate a "Revolt of the Admirals."135
The most important task, however, and one that also affects
the roles and missions issue, is to slow down the process of
military downsizing--to "give time to time" in order to arrive at
a proper mix of military change and continuity within the U.S.
national security strategy. That strategy will not evolve quickly
in the current transition period. Nor should it. The world has
grown too complex to allow a cut and paste approach to the new
era.
As the strategy at the national level develops, the key
mission for the U.S. military is to ensure that a disconnect does
not develop between it and the national military strategy. In the
first transition period, the inwardly focused national strategy
that emerged had disastrous results for the United States as
well as the international community. But it did have the virtue
of a logical linkage with its subordinate and equally disastrous
military strategy. In the second transition period, on the other
hand, national leaders made sweeping commitments matched by an
equally sweeping diminishment of American military power. Task
Force Smith is instructive in this regard not so much as a symbol
of unpreparedness, but as an illustration of what can happen when
a gap is allowed to develop between national security strategy
and one of its subordinate strategies. It is true, of course,
that the concept of national security is more complex in the
current transition. Nevertheless, the experiences of the last
half of this century viewed from both subordinate paradigms
suggest that the world is not yet ready for an overall shift in
the realist paradigm and that consequently national military
power will continue to play a vital role in that concept.
From the vantage point of that realist paradigm looking out
over a world still nasty and brutish in the post-cold war era,
there is comfort in the continuity provided by a two generational
war-in-peace mentality. But that continuity is only possible in
the current transition if changes in the concept of national
security are acknowledged--if, in other words, U.S. domestic,
social and economic needs are not sacrificed to the exigencies of
the permanent Hobbsian struggle as they were to some extent in
the hybrid war that recently ended. For the military this means
becoming more efficient and less costly, more relevant to
domestic issues, and more willing to focus on multilateral
military approaches. Most significant, it means finding new ways
to address radically new threats to national security--an effort
given bureaucratic impetus by Secretary Aspin's recent
restructuring of DOD in which offices were created to address new
security problems ranging from nuclear security and
counterproliferation to economic and environmental security. In
all such efforts, major adjustments will be necessary, not just

in the Department of Defense, but in the entire government and
with the consent of the American people. It is a process, as
Ronald Steel has pointed out, that is never easy in the best of
times.
For the American economy, distorted by a half-century
of reliance on military spending, for American
political elites, who had come to believe that they
were "born to lead," and for an American public,
deprived of an enemy to justify its sacrifices, the
experience will be a wrenching and possibly threatening
one.136
The International System.

The Bipolar Legacy. During the cold war, the industrial and
postindustrial nations somehow managed a dedicated extended
preparation for war almost without precedence in history, while
at the same time keeping the grimmest of the apocalyptic horsemen
at bay. The reason was the evolution of a bipolar distribution of
great power after 1945 between the United States and the Soviet
Union. At the height of the cold war, that system was viewed
primarily through the "long war" paradigm as a destabilizing
influence on international relations. "A bipolar world loses the
perspective for nuance," Henry Kissinger noted in this regard;
a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for
the other. Every issue seems to involve a question of
survival. The smaller countries are torn between a
desire for protection and a wish to escape big-power
dominance. Each of the superpowers is beset by the
desire to maintain its preeminence among its allies, to
increase its influence among the uncommitted, and to
enhance its security vis-a-vis its opponent.137
Over the last decades of the "long peace," however,
bipolarity, whether considered as either balance of power or
hegemonic stability within the overall realist paradigm, took on
a new luster. To begin with, the reduction of key actors to two
superpowers simplified communication, thus avoiding the problems
experienced by the five Great Powers of Europe in the summer of
1914. Moreover, as the "long peace" came to demonstrate,
bipolarity could tolerate defections from coalitions. In this
regard, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the subsequent U.S.
rapprochement with the People's Republic of China stood in sharp
contrast to the two Moroccan crises prior to World War I, both
precipitated by attempts to maintain control over coalitions.138
The "long peace" paradigm is also instructive concerning the
formation of international systems. The cold war demonstrated
that peace does not necessarily emerge from a transition period
dominated by formal negotiating processes that produce an agreed
upon international structure as occurred in 1919. In fact, the

Versailles system barely lasted half as long as that which
emerged from a transition after 1945 that produced no peace
conference and only a minimum of formal structure and
organization to perpetuate the system. Nevertheless, the bipolar
system endured primarily because, as Kenneth Waltz has pointed
out concerning the superpowers, "two states, isolationist by
tradition, untutored in the ways of international politics, and
famed for impulsive behavior, soon showed themselves--not always
and everywhere, but always in crucial cases--to be wary, alert,
cautious, flexible and forebearing."139
Those attributes were demonstrated early in the long war-inpeace. Despite the goal of universalism explicit in both the 1941
Atlantic Charter and the 1942 United Nations Declaration, both
superpowers after World War II used alliances to create
demarcation lines around areas considered of vital interest along
the western and northeastern Eurasian strategic fronts. It was,
in short, nothing more than the Westphalian principle cuius
regio, eius religio (whose the region, his the religion) applied
to the territories liberated from Axis control, as at least one
national leader realized. "Whoever occupies a territory," Stalin
declared, "imposes on it his own social system. . .as far as his
army can reach."140
Those so-called "alliances of position," such as NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, were simple, unambiguous, recognizable, and
conspicuous dividing lines that were useful in establishing rules
of the game for prosecuting war in peacetime. Less useful were
the "alliances of movement," the geographic extension of those
systems, beginning with the "pactomania" on both sides in the
Eisenhower and Khruschev years, as each nation attempted to
outflank the other. The perceived zero-sum bandwagoning effect
that motivated the American thrust was summarized by President
Kennedy: "If the United States were to falter, the whole world
would inevitably move toward the Communist bloc."141 Nevertheless,
despite periodic nods to the ideological concept of roll back,
each nation continued to cooperate for the most part concerning
primary spheres of influence.142
Much of that cooperation had to do with nuclear weapons.
Without those weapons, bipolarity would still have emerged in the
second transition period because of the collapse of the
multipolar system brought on by the "Thirty Years War" of 191445. But it is unlikely that cooperative efforts of any duration
would have been possible without what Joseph Nye has called
"nuclear learning," the vital common ingredient of the two
subordinate paradigms. From both perspectives, it was the
consideration of the consequences of nuclear weapons and
doctrines that led to attempts to provide some structure and
coherence to interstate relations that involved the risk of war.
The result was the acceptance of formal and informal norms as a
basis of guidelines for behavior and rules of engagement. In
terms of nuclear weapons, these included the development of
Permissive Action Links (PAL) on nuclear weapons, second strike

nuclear capabilities, intrusive verification systems, and tacitly
tolerated satellite reconaissance. All this eventually allowed
the establishment of stable security regimes which encouraged
both powers to put long-term mutual considerations above shorter
term self-interests.143
Despite the redundancy of the two paradigms, the
conventional wisdom in the early years of the cold war was that
arms control served only utopian or propaganda purposes or both.
When SALT negotiations began in the late 1960s, the intellectual
dispute centered on those who saw arms control as a disaster for
the United States and those who considered the process as the
last best hope for mankind. By the end of the cold war, the
principle of arms control had come to be accepted not only as an
integral part of the East-West relationship, but as a useful
adjunct to the realist management of power in the international
system. At the same time, this evolution also encouraged the
isolation of dangerous and destabilizing areas of military
competition by means of agreements between the superpowers,
ranging from the Antarctic and Outer Space treaties to those
focused on the Seabed and Biological Weapons.144
The evolution of arms control and other rules of the game
between the superpowers flowed into detente and strengthened the
"long peace" perspective in the closing decades of the cold war.
One result was a "loosening" of bipolarity in which centrifugal
forces began to play on the western treaty regime. At the
beginning of the cold war, that regime stressed the inviolability
of obligations in accordance with the norm pacta sunt servanda
(treaties are binding). By the last decade of that conflict,
there was increased support for the legal doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus, which terminated agreements if the circumstances at
the time of the signing no longer obtained. This change in the
international system was demonstrated in the 1980s with the U.S.
severance of its formal promise to protect Taiwan and its
"strategic divorce" with New Zealand over the issue of docking
American ships carrying nuclear weapons.145
Such changes, however, were effected on a two-way street.
For over 40 years, U.S. political influence with its allies had
been increasingly bound up with the specific Soviet threat in the
context of the "long war." It was that threat that caused the
Europeans and the Japanese to place their security in American
hands and thus defer both economically and politically to
American leadership, whether in the form of trade concessions,
financing of the U.S. treasury deficits or purchases of U.S.
military equipment. With the ascending of the "long peace"
paradigm, those defense dependencies began to fade and with them
the threat-induced deference. At the same time, the rise of West
Germany and Japan only emphasized the lack of congruence between
the primary military and economic rivalries. The peaceful end of
the "long war" further demonstrated the growing importance of
economic power and increasingly brought into question the utility
of force as the ultima ratio of state relations, at least among

the major developed nations.146
No such "de-belated" status occurred in the so-called Third
World, a categorization of nation-states that even owed its
origins to the bipolar nature of the international system. In
that world, the absence of superpower war was not synonymous with
global peace; nor was the absence of system transformation
through war translated into global stability. Instead, recurrent
violence in an unstable "peripheral" system occurred alongside a
stable "central" system, with an estimated 127 wars and over 21
million war-related deaths taking place in the developing world
during the cold war.147
From the "long war" perspective, the bipolar struggle
distracted from the post-World War II decolonization of the
planet, often leading to abrupt actions by the great powers that
caused the absence of viable, indigenous state structures. Most
important, the "long war" caused both sides to perceive that
there were important interests engaged almost everywhere in the
world. One result was global militarization, in which the Third
World served as an important outlet for the massive amounts of
increasingly more sophisticated arms produced in the developed
world. Moreover, despite superpower cooperation on the NonProliferation Treaty, the exigencies of the "long war" caused
both sides to ignore the problem in states considered
strategically important. As a consequence, with the exception of
South Africa, which was isolated because of its racial--not its
nuclear--policies, nuclear proliferation occurred during the long
war with "surprisingly few diplomatic costs."148

Interdependence. Both paradigms help explain why the United
States used its economic dominance in the second transition
period for international economic reconstruction and why that
dominance eventually eroded. In one sense, the post-1945 policy
was created in an economic context that foresaw prosperity and
peace as a result of the reconstructed economies of Western
Europe and Japan within an overall interdependent framework of
free trade and monetary stability. The resultant prosperity,
American planners believed, would not only constrain the divisive
forces of nationalism that had been so destructive in the first
half of the 20th century, but also set the geopolitical stage for
containing the Soviet Union while providing the global economic
growth necessary for Third World development. The consequences of
that economic vision were the Bretton Woods system, the Marshall
Plan, and the dependency of the Third World on the industrial
nations for capital and markets.149
This growing interdependence was given added impetus by
dramatic advances in communication, transportation and technology
that emerged from the symbiosis of war-in-peace. One result, as
John Herz pointed out with the advent of ICBMs in the Eisenhower
years, was that the "hard shell" of national boundaries had been
rendered "permeable."150 Added to this, was the fact that force
and military power increasingly came to appear less useful during

the "long peace" as tools to deal with complex economic problems
and social crisis. As a consequence, the traditional bond between
such power and the organizing legitimacy that had emerged from
Westphalia began to weaken. That legitimacy was based on the
state's ability to shield the citizen from the capricious
violence in the international community. In return, the
inhabitants of states took on citizenship which normally
included, at the very least, the payment of taxes and
participation, if required, in the common defense of the state.
But if the state could no longer be depended upon to provide a
defensive shield for its citizenry; or if the state had in effect
become a contributor to the problems of a society, then the
ancient agreement forged at Westphalia was destroyed: "the roof,"
as Herz noted, would be "blown off" the historic shelter provided
by the nation-state since the end of the Thirty Years War.151
To this refocus on the viability of the nation-state was
added the changing nature of conflict brought on by the peaceful,
bipolar great power stalemate of the "long war." Modern war, as
it emerged in that stalemate, was no longer the sole preserve of
the state in the sense that it had established norms, rules, and
etiquettes, as well as standardized strategies. In that context,
during the cold war, declarations were rarely exchanged, the
identity of warring parties could not always be established, and
many military actions did not conform to the traditional concept
of two or more national armies fighting each other. The result,
as Brian Jenkins predicted, was that the use of force for
political purposes has come to range from intifadas, terrorism
and insurgent conflicts, through peacekeeping and peacemaking
operations to "conventional" set warfare between the organized
armed forces of nation-states:
With continuous, sporadic armed conflict, blurred in
time and space, waged on several levels by a large
array of national and subnational forces, warfare in
the last quarter of the twentieth century may well come
to resemble warfare in the Italian Renaissance or
warfare in the early seventeenth century before the
emergence of national armies and more organized modern
warfare.152
These trends culminated in the mid-1970s with the rise of
"interdependence" studies, which criticized the state-centric
"realist" tendency to reduce all international relations to a
struggle for power in the face of emerging multicentric
transnationalism, particularly in the area of economics. Global
interdependence, those studies concluded, was altering the nature
of traditional geopolitical rivalries. Integration and
cooperation were becoming at least as important as balance of
power, since global networks were evolving apart from traditional
military and ideological alliances. The new trend was toward
mutual security in an interdependent world based on an
international system that was functioning less and less on a
"self-help" basis. The traditional security game, in short, could

be conducted as much with the logic of Adam Smith as Thucydides.
Nevertheless, even the earliest proponents of the new school were
not prepared for a major shift in the realist paradigm.
We must. . .be cautious about the prospect that rising
interdependence is creating a brave new world of
cooperation to replace the bad old world of
international conflict. As every parent of small
children knows, baking a larger pie does not stop
disputes over the size of the slices.153
The realist response to the concept of interdependence was
to acknowledge the socioeconomic transformations that had
occurred during the cold war, while denying any significant
impact of those changes on the state-centric paradigm focused on
the maximization of power in an anarchic world. Kenneth Waltz,
for instance, pointed out that transnational processes and nonstate actors acquired significance only in the context of a
state-controlled international environment. Those states, he
argued, "may choose to interfere little in the affairs of nonstate actors for long periods of time"; nevertheless, they "set
the terms of the intercourse. . . .When the crunch comes, states
remake the rules by which other actors operate." As a consequence
of the continuing structural predominance of states, the realist
paradigm remained firm: no new theories were needed. "A theory
that denies the central role of states," Waltz concluded, "will
be needed only if non-state actors develop to the point of
rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few minor
ones. They show no sign of doing that."154
In effect, this so-called "neorealist" approach was an
update of the realist paradigm without an alteration of its basic
premises: a synthesis of that paradigm's assumptions and the
modern realities of the post-industrial era. One variant of that
approach was the examination of states and transnational entities
together in the context of "international regimes," where they
could deal with each other through non-hierarchical processes
based on agreed sets of principles and procedures that operated
in particular issue areas. Despite the added focus on new actors
and transnational processes, however, regime theory remained
essentially within the realist paradigm, grafting institutions
and procedures onto the state-centric system. That system, as
Waltz also pointed out, was flexible enough to allow in a passive
sense "informal rules to develop," a flexibility that also
permitted states to intervene "to change rules that no longer
suit them."155
The neorealist approach does not suffice for those theorists
who emphasize the rise of a transnational, multicentric system of
international relations within the security provided by the
bipolar war-in-peace framework of the cold war. At the same time,
they are unable to postulate a complete shift from the realist
paradigm. James Rosenau, for instance, sees the new multicentric
world as neither superordinate nor subordinate to the historic

state-centric world. The result is a framework of coexistence
that posits sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors as
inhabitants of separate worlds, but interacting in such a way as
to ensure their continued existence. That interaction, however,
is sustained by circumstances in which the state is increasingly
inadequate and yet, as Rosenau admits, also indispensable.
All of these doubts notwithstanding, it is difficult to
ignore the present capacity of states to control the
instruments of coercive force and the publics needed to
support their use. The range of issues on which these
instruments can be used effectively has narrowed
considerably in recent decades, but not yet to the
point where it is reasonable to presume that states and
their world are dissolving into the multicentric
environment. Instead, states must be regarded as still
capable of maintaining the norms and practices of their
own international system. . . .156

Change and Continuity. The demise of the bipolar
international system is the most obvious change in the post-cold
war era. One of the poles in that system simply ceased to operate
and then ceased to exist. A major reason for the end of the
Soviet Union was that there could be no rational military victory
as that bipolar relationship evolved in the long war. The result
was that military competition between the two superpowers was
prolonged for over 40 years in the "long peace." For the USSR,
the extended preparation for conflict delayed modernization
while wasting resources--all to a point that finally brought down
not only the 70-year-old Soviet regime, but the 300-year-old
Russian Empire as well.157
There are other important legacies of the bipolar war-inpeace system. The dramatic cold war scientific and technological
advances set in train a curious blend of integrative and
disintegrative forces and trends that are adding to the complex
tensions of the current transition period. The integrative force
that increasingly linked global economies in the "long peace,"
for instance, also holds out the spectral potential of global
depression or, at the very least, nations more susceptible to
disintegrative actions, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
demonstrated. In a similar manner, the advances in communications
and transportation that have spread the results of medical and
scientific discoveries around the world are countered by the
malign transnational results of nuclear technology, the drug
trade, terrorism, AIDS and global warming.158
At the same time, those advances also led to the
unprecedented flow of ideas--truly a development that confirmed
Friedrich Schiller's ideal in his poem, "Die Gedanken Sind Frei."
Those ideas, combined with the integrative forces of democratic
politics and market economies, ultimately brought about the
disintegrative sweep of revolutions throughout Central and
Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989.159 The two-edged sword of this

transnational force continues to dominate the current transition
period. From this viewpoint, Marshall McLuhan's image of a
communications-induced "global village" does not take into
account the power of information to reinforce nationalism and
move nations away from a global political identity. Instead of
one global village, as Joseph Nye has pointed out, "there are
villages around the globe more aware of each other."160
From the "long war" perspective, the bipolar contest between
two ideologies hid this basic strength and durability of
nationalism. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Europe where
that contest had moderated centuries-old animosities, such as
those between France and Germany and between Greece and Turkey.
At the same time, the Soviets had suppressed similar differences
in the East, whether between Czechs and Poles or Hungarians and
Romanians. In the current transition period, there are daily
reminders of that "new religion" in the Irish question, the
Basque problem in Spain, or the disputes between the Waloons and
Flemings in Belgium. And in the former Yugoslavia, nationalism
has reemerged in an area that Bismarck once said was not worth
the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, but which nonetheless
brought on the maelstrom of the Great War. That area is just one
of many examples of how unqualified support for the integrative
force of national self-determination in the wake of the long
ideological war can contribute to enormous global disorder and
disintegration, particularly in a world populated by at least 170
states, less than 10 percent of which are ethnically
homogeneous.161
All this serves as a reminder that challenges to the statecentric paradigm are not new in international affairs. As one
historian has pointed out, the 19th century Great Powers were far
more integrated than their more recent counterparts--creating in
that age of borderless commerce and travel, "the belle epoque of
interdependence."162 Observing that state of affairs, as we have
seen, Norman Angell argued prior to World War I in The Great
Illusion that the level of economic interdependence in Europe was
so high that war was not a cost effective proposition. And after
World War II, there were those who argued that specific functions
could be taken over by varied entities that would ultimately
supersede individual states.163
Nonetheless, the nation-state continues to endure. The North
American Free Trade Agreement, for instance, is a current example
of the continued precariousness of interdependence at its basic
economic level as well as the residual strength of nationalism.
Moreover, as the debates and referenda over the Maastricht
Agreement demonstrated, even a Europe poised to establish a
regional common market is not about to make the state system
obsolete. "The development of regional integration," Joseph Nye
has acknowledged, "outstripped the development of regional
communities."164
In any event, neither the change nor the continuity embodied

in the concept of interdependence appears likely to increase the
stability of the international system in the current transition
period. In terms of change, the new forces of integration will
continue to generate those of disintegration. As for continuity,
even translating the basic economic underpinnings of
interdependence into the geopolitics of the state system presents
fundamental problems. The classic liberal argument, for instance,
is that the more contact between states and their populations,
the less danger of conflict. But, in fact, as the example of
Norman Angell illustrates, historically those nations with the
most contact have most frequently gone to war with each other.
Moreover, the "long peace" is a reminder that it was fear of a
hot war, not the desire for profit, that brought about superpower
cooperation.165
A concomitant to all that is a need for continuity with the
traditional concepts of military power and war in the current
transition, even as the stock of other elements of national power
rises in an increasingly complex world. Nowhere was this more
dramatically illustrated than in the Gulf War. "The notion that
economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence
is a materialist illusion," Charles Krauthammer noted in this
regard. "Economic power is a necessary condition for great power
status. But it certainly is not sufficient, as has been made
clear by the recent behavior of Germany and Japan, which have
generally hidden under the table since the first shots rang out
in Kuwait."166
And while it is true that the "long peace" reinforced a
tendency by the developed industrialized nations to discredit war
between themselves, there was no such tendency in the Third
World, increasingly militarized as the "long war" took on global
dimensions. In fact, there was a general perception that war and
violence could improve situations, primarily because many of the
developing nations achieved statehood through armed struggle
during the years of the cold war. And although there may have
been some lessons for Third World nations concerning the futility
of such prolonged struggles as the Cambodian upheaval or the
Iran-Iraq war, the majority of those countries developed no
apocalyptic visions of war similar to those which developed in
the West in response to both World Wars and the cold war. How
different this outlook on war could be was illustrated by the
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1984:
War is a blessing for the world and for all nations. It
is God who incites men to fight and to kill. . . .A
prophet is all-powerful. Through war he purifies the
earth. The mullahs with corrupt hearts who say that all
this is contrary to the teachings of the Koran are
unworthy of Islam.167
Weapons proliferation in the Third World will continue to
augment these tendencies in the current transition period,
because the legacy of the "long war" lives on in both the East

and the West in the form of bureaucratic, industrial and research
infrastructures oriented on the design, procurement and
production of military weapons and equipment. It is, in short,
extremely difficult to turn off the military-industrial spigot,
particularly when the health of national economies after 40 years
of chronic preparation for war is tied up, at least in part, with
foreign military sales. Added to this is the problem of nuclear
proliferation. From the "long peace" perspective, the lesson from
the cold war might seem to be that the possession of large
numbers of nuclear weapons creates a sense of responsibility on
the part of nations, thus diminishing the temptation to take
risks, regardless of differences in history, culture or
circumstances. That is, of course, hardly a comforting lesson
based on recent experiences with such rogue states as Libya and
Iraq. The basic fact remains in the current transition that the
proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, particularly
to regional hegemons, will continue to exacerbate the uneven
growth of power among states, identified long before the end of
the cold war as the principal problem in international
relations.168
As a consequence of all this, there is still a strong sense
of continuity with the overall realist paradigm. Change in the
form of growing interdependence is, of course, a fact of life.
But world politics is still dominated by the state-centric
system, which in fact requires more realism and power in the
current transition period in order to balance the integrative and
disintegrative forces spawned by that interdependence. For
interdependence promotes insecurity and competition without
providing the means for mitigating that insecurity and for
placing bounds on that competition. Moreover, even if
interdependence is beneficial to all players, those benefits may
vary to the extent that the perception of those marked
disparities may become a new source of conflict. It is, in short,
a phenomenon that creates the need for greater order without
providing assurance that the need will be met.169
The hegemonic stability imposed on the forces and trends
unleashed by interdependence disappeared with the cold war. But
there is much to be learned from the cooperative efforts that
emerged from a long militarized peace combined with a long
peaceful militarization. The creation and evolution of NATO, for
instance, has many lessons for solving the problems posed by the
coexistence of integrated supranational military forces with
national military units. Equally important, in this regard, are
the projects for managing power from the second transition
period, abandoned as the cold war began. Among them was
Roosevelt's grand design of the victorious powers acting in
concert as part of his "World Policemen" scheme, with its
associated plan to create an Anglo-American-Soviet "air corps"
for global patrols.170
Such great power combinations are traditionally viewed as
negative imperialism and hegemonic dominance, a tendency

reinforced by the long bipolar configuration of the international
system during the cold war. Over the years, as an example, the
Yalta and Potsdam accords have received bad press in both the
West and the East. But it should not be forgotten that those
agreements also reflected the willingness of the great powers to
take responsibility for maintaining the international order, a
responsibility best expressed in the Charter of the United
Nations. It is this great power responsibility that furthers the
linkage between those regime theorists and neorealists who see
international institutions as a means to regularize cooperation
and provide support for multilateral policies in an anarchic and
uncertain world. In the end, since states cannot be forced to
choose international over national interests, a sense of global
responsibility among the most powerful international actors must
provide the consensual leadership for international regimes
within the realist paradigm.171
This is not enough for the critics of that paradigm. "When
the Emperor's clothes are tattered," one concluded, "many a
tailor will be found working on new robes."172 But while those
garments may be in better condition, if change is allowed to
obscure the very real continuities from the past in this current
transition period, the new robes will also be ill-fitting. The
rate and direction of global change should not be exaggerated.
"[T]o be prematurely right in international affairs," Owen
Harries has pointed out, "to anticipate a trend too early and to
act on it, can be as fatal as being dead wrong."173

CHAPTER 4
BROTHER CAN YOU PARADIGM?
Tesman: "But, good heavens, we know nothing of the
future."
Lovborg: "No, but there is a thing or two to
about it all the same."

be said

Henrik Ibsen, Hedda Gabler
Today its critics have branded realism obsolete, a
relic of the days of courts and princes, an approach
out-of-sync with a world of borderless economies,
peace-loving democracies, and global crises like the
greenhouse effect.
Fareed Zakaria174
The cold war reflected two countertraditions in U.S.
history. On the one hand was the idea of exceptionalism, that
America stood for something new, destined to lead the old world
from a discredited international system to a new order. This was
embodied in Jeffersonian diplomacy, focused on grand objectives,
which because of the force of the American "City on the Hill"
example, would not require the use of force for achievement. That
tradition was carried on and expanded by Woodrow Wilson, the
articulator of American ideals, aspirations and, particularly,
the nation's reason of state, the expansion of freedom. On the
other hand was the Hamiltonian tradition used to great effect by
Henry Cabot Lodge in the debates over the new world order during
the first transition period. That approach eschewed grand
ambitions, retaining a belief in military force and preparedness
while pursuing a foreign policy tied to limited national
interests.175
Both traditions were indispensable to the strategic
consensus that animated U.S. national security policy throughout
the cold war. Simply put, that consensus came about because the
threat could be expressed in terms of both realist concerns with
American security and idealist concerns with the defense of order
and free institutions. Thus, there was the concept of containment
squarely in the Hamilton-Lodge tradition with its emphasis on the
avoidance of war by preparedness, moderation of diplomatic
ambition, and, above all, balance of power by means of an
enduring alliance system. At the same time, the JeffersonWilsonian influence was evident as early as the Truman Doctrine
with its image of free people working at their own destinies in
their own way. That image combined the distinctly Wilsonian
equation of a peaceful, orderly world with a truly democratic one
that could only be achieved through U.S. leadership.
The Vietnam experience did considerable damage to the

strategic consensus. Nevertheless, the link between establishing
order and freedom and ensuring U.S. security did not break. And
in fact the promotion of freedom and order became the basis for
restoring domestic consensus in foreign policy in both the Carter
(human rights) and Reagan (the Democratic Revolution)
administrations. Nor was the linkage absent in the Gulf War, in
which President Bush embarked on a new world order that appeared
to be a functional equivalent of global containment for the new
transition period. On the one hand was the realist perception of
world order as the product of a stable distribution of power
among the major states. On the other was the Wilsonian tradition
of the indivisibility of peace, reflected in the President's
declaration at the beginning of the Gulf War that "every act of
aggression unpunished. . . strengthens the forces of chaos and
lawlessness that, ultimately, threaten us all."176
At the conclusion of that war, President Bush informed the
nation that the "specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in
the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula."177 But in some very
important ways, the Bush administration had returned the United
States in the Gulf to a role that Americans ultimately had
rejected a generation earlier in Vietnam. At that time, President
Johnson had also defended the commitment to world order as being
inseparable from U.S. security, with the American intervention
repeatedly justified in terms of freedom and self-determination.
In that context, the Johnson administration contended, a refusal
to play policeman would place world order in jeopardy and with it
American security. "We can be safe," Dean Rusk commented, "only
to the extent that our total environment is safe."178
In a similar manner, the Gulf War seemed to bear out the
argument that international stability required a continuity of
role by the world's most powerful and trusted nation. But a major
part of containment for the United States had been the role of
custodian of freedom against a specific adversary. Now, in the
new transition period, it appeared America was to become the
principal custodian of stability against any state threatening
the international order. The shift presented difficulties. To
maintain a fragile peace that remained unstable required
something more like a policeman than a leader of a coalition
working against an identifiable, hostile adversary. But a nation
that throughout its history, and particularly in the long war-inpeace, had grown accustomed to perceiving itself as the exemplar
and defender of freedom, was bound to find the role of policeman
much less appealing.179
As a consequence, the equation of world order with American
security has become far less compelling in the current
transition. Added to this are the difficulties in keeping the
ideals of order and freedom together in a changing world where
disintegrative forces unleashed by the end of the cold war appear
to be, at least temporarily, in the ascendancy over those of
integration. "If I had to choose between justice and disorder on
the one hand," Goethe once noted, "and injustice and order on the

other, I would always choose the latter."180 This is a bit strong,
but not so easily dismissed when considering whether Yugoslavia
is better off today than under Tito, or whether Somalia improved
its lot in the wake of the overthrow of its most recent dictator.
"America's moral fervor, always close to the surface," one
pollster recently concluded, "will be rechanneled from
anticommunism to a new era of American patriotism centered on
improving the quality of America's goods and services--an
uninspiring vision, perhaps, for Cold Warriors but not for the
hard-pressed American public."181
Such a conclusion may be premature. After all, the forces
and trends set in train during and after the cold war have not
yet played out in the current transition. But certainly for great
powers in the past after long wars, there was a tendency for
excesses of domestic introversion to follow the excesses of
international conflict. The concomitant to that pattern was
normally the rebirth of a balance-of-power system as
nationalistic issues gained priority over the cooperative
necessities of reducing power conflicts. The result for the
United States in such a milieu could be a retreat into
parochialism and insularity just when increasing interdependence
renders such a state destabilizing; and just when American
leadership and resources are required for an anarchic world, made
more so by the disintegrative forces of interdependence.
An alternative to all that in the current transition is a
return to the "higher realism" of Woodrow Wilson. That realism
required the United States to accept a leadership role in world
affairs based on values that would claim the enduring allegiance
of the American public. At the same time, Wilson warned that a
policeman's solitary lot was not a happy one; and that by
attempting such a role alone, the United States could become a
militarized garrison state and thereby destroy the values and
ideals that formed the distinctive nature of American society.
Much of that came to pass at times during the cold war. But the
impact of the "long war" and "long peace" as shown in all three
levels of analysis has also set the stage for a third attempt in
this century at the management of power under a systemic
framework of collective security.
The Management of Power.
In the current transition period, the concept of collective
security has emerged almost by default, rather than on its own
merit. Unilateralism for the United States appears increasingly
ineffective or illegitimate because of the forces and trends
still swirling in the domestic and international arenas as a
result of the cold war. And alliances without an adversary seem
anachronistic and empty, lacking, as Richard Betts has pointed
out, that "animating originality that revolutionary political
changes seem to mandate."182 The result has been an invocation of
collective security as the way to manage power in the post-cold

war era that at times appears more as a celebration of peace than
as a way to enforce it. This tendency to see peace as the premise
of a security system rather than its product was captured at the
height of the cold war by Arnold Wolfers:
Promotion of the idea of collective security has
created a psychological situation in which the United
States cannot turn its back on the concept, not because
of what collective security can accomplish. . .but
because of what millions of people. . .believe it may
accomplish in time. Collective security has come to be
the chief symbol of hope that. . .a community of
nations will develop in which there will be no more
war.183
Despite all this, the Wilsonian ideal type of collective
security is no more possible in the current transition than it
was in 1919 or 1945. The prerequisite shift in the overall
paradigm of international relations has simply not occurred,
leaving realism, in E. H. Carr's description, as "the impact of
thinking upon wishing."184 That realism was evident during the
second transition in the founding of the United Nations, which
assumed a multipolar distribution of power with the five great
powers, protected by their vetos, enforcing collective security.
But cold war bipolarity hobbled that more realistic version of
Wilson's institutional approach. As a consequence, the superpower
veto became a staple of the U.N. in the coming decades; and the
organization was reduced to more modest peacekeeping roles, in
which the multilateral forces could be brushed aside at any time
the belligerents wished to resume conflict, as they were, for
example, in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War.185
Only when the Soviets temporarily boycotted the U.N.
Security Council in June 1950 was there the multilateral response
to major aggression envisioned in the U.N. charter. And even
then, while it was symbolically important for other nations to
join in collective action, only American military participation
was vital to the outcome of the Korean War. In a similar manner,
collective security emerged in the Gulf War, because the United
States asserted itself as a hegemon in place of the bipolar
balance of power to draw in the U.N. Ostensibly, interests such
as access to oil were not the reasons for the American response.
Nor was democracy at stake since the ruling family oligarchy
reclaimed Kuwait at the end of the conflict. The primary
explanation by the Bush administration was opposition to
aggression as a matter of principle. It was that universality
with its implied automaticity that brought the concept of ideal
collective security into the post-cold war equation--an
unrealistic development that has only confused the major issue of
power management, as responses to the situation in the former
Yugoslavia demonstrate.186
Ironically, the Gulf War actually demonstrated that global
circumstances now resemble those which the founders of the U.N.

envisaged in 1945. At that time, the great power directorate of
the Security Council was created based on the principle that
power must be commensurate with responsibility. As a consequence,
what emerged in the United Nations during the second transition
period was a system that could only work against smaller powers-hardly a significant guarantee, the critics at the time
emphasized, for maintaining international peace and stability. In
the post-cold war world, what was once perceived as a grave
defect has emerged almost as a virtue, particularly in the wake
of the Gulf War. For the major threats in this new era appear to
be posed only by smaller powers that have not yet reconciled
their aspirations and level of development with the norms of
conventional statecraft. As a result, the U.N. may emerge in the
current transition as the best means to express the community of
great powers that Wilson had attempted to find in the League.187
In any event, the concept of a great power condominium is
the logical way for the United States to achieve Wilson's "higher
realism" in the current transition period. Ironically, the model
for the concept is the 1815 Concert of Europe, scorned a century
later by Wilson when he promulgated pure collective security as
the best way to manage power. But in a world still dominated by
the realist paradigm, that ideal type at one end of the
collective security continuum is simply not feasible. A concert,
on the other hand, is situated on the opposite end of that
continuum and:
represents the most attenuated form of collective
security. Though predicated on the notion of all
against one, membership in a concert is restricted to
the great powers of the day. A small group of major
powers agrees to work together to resist aggression;
they meet on a regular basis to monitor events and, if
necessary, to orchestrate collective initiatives. A
concert's geographic scope is flexible. Members can
choose to focus on a specific region or regions, or to
combat aggression on a global basis. Finally, a
concert entails no binding or codified commitments to
collective action. Rather, decisions are taken through
informal negotiations, through the emergence of a
consensus.188
To be successful, any such concert that emerges in the
current transition period will depend, as it did in 1815, on
involvement by all great powers. This would include, at the very
least, the addition of Germany and Japan to the five great powers
serving as the permanent representatives of the Security Council.
Such involvement, however, is not preordained in the post-cold
war era. In the former Soviet Union, for example, economic reform
may prove so onerous as to preclude a stable and active foreign
policy for a self-absorbed Russia, which like Japan after World
War II, may need a period without international responsibilities
in order to reestablish a growing economy. And even the United
States will have to deal with the effects of the "long war." Like

the 1920s, there will certainly be strong incentives to put
domestic priorities ahead of everything else--a tendency as
Richard Rosecrance has observed, toward "a disastrous
reconcentration on the American umbilicus."189
Ideological solidarity and renunciation of force are other
obvious preconditions for a successful concert of powers, as they
were at Vienna. The long peace-in-war made force by the great
powers against each other virtually unthinkable. Inducements
evolved during the cold war for those states to resolve
peacefully, or even tolerate, accumulated grievances that prior
to 1945 might have led to major conflict. The appeal, of course,
was more to fear than logic. Nevertheless, behavior patterns born
of fear can, over time, come to seem very logical. As a
consequence, the cold war has already created, in the day-to-day
interaction of the great powers, the habits and mechanisms for
managing power in an anarchic world.190
This does not translate, however, into consistent great
power cooperation in pursuit of the collective or public good.
That is why the concert system can function within the realist
paradigm. It is in this sense that the Concert of Europe is most
instructive: the ideas of the common good did not always triumph
over competition; war was always a possibility; the maintenance
of peace was often at the expense of the weaker powers and of
justice; and the great powers often defended their interests
narrowly. The Concert, in fact, was always relatively fragile;
but it was that very fragility that was a source of strength.
Because the statesmen of the 19th century believed that the
Concert could not survive major shocks, they were circumspect in
their behavior, fearing that if they were not, the Concert could
collapse, leaving the management of power to normal balance-ofpower politics.191
The major criticism of any concert today would be the same
as in the 19th century: the elitist nature of the system. But the
basic fact of life in international relations is that some
cooperation among the great powers is a prerequisite for world
order within the state system. Great powers simply will not
disappear. The issues of peace or war, security or insecurity in
the world political system are largely determined more by these
powers than by others. It is also a fact of life viewed from the
realist perspective that when great powers work together to
further global interests, they also may be promoting special
interests of their own, whether it is preserving the political
status quo or guarding their ascendancy within their own spheres
of influence. And it may even be that without such special
interests, collaboration either would not occur or would not
progress.192
For all these reasons, the middle and smaller powers of the
world will keep a vigilant watch on any emerging concert of great
powers in the post-cold war era. Such a concert can mitigate much
of the suspicions by such measures as refraining from making its

role too explicit or co-opting leading secondary powers for
particular purposes. In any event, all political systems, and
particularly international regimes, have some dissatisfied
elements that will not necessarily undermine the foundation of
the system. But unless a concert of great powers addresses the
fundamental aspirations and the rising expectations of the
developing world, the system will only exacerbate the growing
bipolar nature of North-South relations. The "have nots" of that
world represent a majority of the population and the states in
international society. Moreover, weapons proliferation has the
potential to bring future military challenges from those states,
at least at the regional level, to a point not too dissimilar to
that which occurred in the 1930s when Britain and France,
representing the League of Nations, confronted the revisionist
states of Germany, Italy and Japan. At that time, the "have not"
nations represented one of the two principal concentrations of
military power in the world; and the alternative to any type of
peaceful change that would have appeased their demands was war.193
The alternative to a concert of powers in the state-centric
realist paradigm is the decentralized balance-of-power system
that resulted in both world wars of this century. Other systems
for managing power will require a paradigm shift. One example is
to return full circle to the hierarchical medieval paradigm in
which war in the sense of organized violence between sovereign
states does not exist, because sovereign states do not exist.
But, as we have seen, the 17th century shift from that paradigm
to the realist framework came about because of crisis in the form
of ubiquitous violence and insecurity.
And while concepts such as ideal collective security and
world government still deal with nation-states, their
implementation requires paradigm shifts made unnecessary by the
new assumptions. The ideals of universality and automaticity in
pure collective security are based on covenants between all
states and a central organization. In a similar manner, world
government by contract is a system by which all sovereign states
subordinate themselves to that government. The basic case for
both concepts is the need to manage power in a Hobbesian world.
But if states do exist in a Hobbesian state of nature, the
covenants by which they are to emerge from it cannot occur. For
if, as Hobbes maintained, "covenants without swords are but
words," this will also be true of covenants directed toward the
establishment of a collective security organization or a
universal government.194
To make a paradigm shift in these circumstances will not
help. The advocate of world government, for instance, can
demonstrate the feasibility and desirability of his scheme only
by shifting to a new paradigm, the basic assumption of which is
that international relations do not resemble a Hobbesian state of
nature. Covenants in that framework are more than words,
providing as they do the basis for collaboration between
sovereign states. But to make that basic assumption is to weaken

the imperative for bringing the international state of nature
under control by means of a shift from the realist paradigm.
World government theorists are thus stranded in a world which,
viewed through a realist paradigm, makes their propositions as
utopian as that envisioned by Alfred Lord Tennyson in "Locksley
Hall," 150 years ago:
Till the war-drums throbb'd no longer,
and the battle flags were furl'd
In the Parliament of man, the
Federation of the world.
There the common sense of most shall
hold a fretful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber
lapt in universal law.195
The concept of a great power concert has no such utopian
image. Instead, it provides a "realistic" way to manage power
that will satisfy the American public grown accustomed in the
"long war" to the day-to-day operation of a security regime. Most
important, the move toward multilateral great power cooperation
will allow the United States to continue a leadership role in
world affairs without an overwhelming financial burden even as it
refocuses on domestic threats to national security and responds
to the demands of an increasingly interdependent world. There is
a story, in this regard, of a man who was lost in Scotland and
asked a farmer for directions to Edinburgh. "Oh sir," the farmer
replied, "if I were you, I shouldn't start from here."196 The idea
that the state system does not provide the best starting point to
explore the management of power has something of this quality.
The fact is that it is within the state system in the current
transition period that the "higher realism" of Woodrow Wilson can
emerge successfully in a concert of great powers.
Strategic Vision.
"Where there is no vision," the book of Proverbs concludes,
"the people perish." Vision, however, is not enough. As history
has consistently demonstrated, there is a symbiotic relationship
between strategic vision and decisive authority. Without such
authority to implement the vision, there remains only the sterile
utterances of the prophet. On the other hand, decisive authority
without vision, particularly at the highest levels of government,
will produce politicians awash in a sea of expediency. But
combine the insight of the prophet with the authority of the
politician, and the result is the statesman at the national
strategic level capable of achieving strategic vision.
It is by means of strategic vision that the statesman shapes
and controls projected change instead of simply reacting to the
forces and trends that swirl without direction into the future.
He accomplishes this by dint of imagination and creativity and by
balancing idealism with realism. Opportunism in this regard does

not diminish statesmanship. Anyone desiring to shape events,
whether politician or statesman, must be opportunistic to some
degree. But the politician merely adjusts his purposes to fit
reality, while the visionary statesman attempts to shape reality
in terms of his purpose or the change he desires. "When technique
becomes exalted over purpose," Henry Kissinger has pointed out in
this regard, "men become the victims of their own complexities.
They forget that every great achievement in every field was a
vision before it became a reality. . . .There are two kinds of
realists: those who use facts and those who create them. The West
requires nothing so much as men able to create their own
reality."197
Such leaders in times of upheaval and great change can
inspire, challenge, and educate in terms of their image of the
future. Education is particularly important, since statesmen have
to bridge the gap between their vision and the experiences of
their people, between their intuition and national tradition. It
is not an easy process. As a result, there are few periods in
history in which the confluence of strategic vision and decisive
authority has lasted for very long.
Nowhere, as we have seen, is this dilemma better illustrated
than in the efforts of Metternich and Castlereagh to form a
Concert of Europe after 1814. Metternich is an example of a
statesman who limits his vision to the current experiences of his
people and thus ultimately dooms his policy to sterility. In his
case, it was a vision of the status quo, of the preservation of
the multinational Austrian Empire in a time of great rising
nationalism. Castlereagh, on the other hand, is an example of a
statesman whose vision so far outruns the experience of his
people that he fails to achieve the necessary domestic consensus
for decisive authority, however wise the vision. That vision
concerned the involvement of traditionally insular Great Britain
in peacetime Continental politics in order to ensure equilibrium
among the Great Powers.198
In the 20th century, each of the post-World War transitions
for the United States were marked by strategic visions for
managing power. Like Castlereagh, Wilson's vision of ideal
collective security went far beyond American national experience.
The result was an impasse that he attempted to circumvent by
appealing directly to the public for the authority to implement
his strategic vision. During his whistle-stop tour of the
country, an exhausted Wilson suffered a massive stroke and was
incapacitated for the remainder of his presidency. In the end, it
hardly mattered. The Wilsonian vision required a shift from the
realist paradigm which itself was not fully understood by a
nation and a people poised for a return to the soft incubus of
isolationistic "normalcy."
In the second transition period, George Kennan's strategic
vision of containing the Soviet Union was rooted squarely in the
realist paradigm. The orientation of that vision on the Soviet

threat was significant. As that threat became more apparent in
the opening years of the cold war, the orientation insured the
acceptance of that vision, first by governmental elites and then
by the American people. Moreover, because that threat was to
endure for 45 years with varying degrees of intensity, the entire
succession of U.S. Presidents in the cold war from Truman to
Reagan enjoyed the historically anomalous coincidence of a
coherent strategic vision and overall decisive authority.
The current transition period is not one in which a
strategic vision that would balance foreign with domestic policy
can easily play a major role. This is one of the ironic legacies
of the long war-in-peace. For in the successful pursuit of the
overall strategic vision in that twilight conflict, successive
administrations set in motion military, social, and economic
forces that increased the tension between these contradictory
elements of U.S. national security policy. To that misfortune,
largely in reaction to this tension, were added the political
effects of a resurgent Congress. There is, of course, a natural
adversarial process between the congressional and executive
branches implicit in the U.S. Constitution. But that process was
largely dormant between Pearl Harbor and Tet '68. The massive
congressional reentry into foreign affairs since Vietnam has
hindered and will continue to hinder the confluence of a balanced
vision with authority in the executive branch.
Further complicating the problem is the changing nature of
the threat. In recent years, the American people have become
increasingly aware of the domestic threats to their national
security, whether in the form of illicit drugs, inner city rot,
the savings and loan fiasco, or the national debt. At the same
time, the successful realization of the strategic vision that
animated Western strategy throughout the cold war has also
diminished a public perception of international menace. In
foreign affairs, the threat now seems more speculative, certainly
less urgent, whether it be the fragmentation of Yugoslavia or the
prospect of Russia metamorphosing into another Weimar, sullenly
nursing its grudge in the wake of its cold war defeat.
Nevertheless, there are potential threats in the
international arena that should be addressed along with domestic
threats in any new strategic vision if that vision is to achieve
the credibility that will eventually result in decisive
authority. To begin with, there is the proliferation of mass
destruction weapons. "By the year 2000," former Secretary of
Defense Cheney has noted, "it is estimated that at least 15
developing nations will have the ability to build ballistic
missiles--eight of which either have or are near to acquiring
nuclear capabilities. Thirty countries will have chemical weapons
and ten will be able to deploy biological weapons as well."199
Added to this concern is the emergence of nations marked by
resentment against the West and the status quo with the
capability and the inclination to use these weapons of mass
destruction. These are revolutionary powers whose principal issue

is not adjustment within the international system, but the system
itself. They not only feel threatened, a regular feature of the
realist state system, but they also can never be reassured short
of absolute security, a precondition for the absolute insecurity
of their opponents.
Equally important in this regard are threats posed by an
increasingly interdependent world. There is, for example, the
growing recognition that planet Earth is a very fragile ship
hurtling through space--that separate events ranging from the
destruction of rain forests to depletion of the ozone layer may
be the ultimate threats to national security. Or, as another
example, there is the growing disparity between the North and the
South, the developed and developing countries of the world. The
South has watched the North fight three great internecine wars in
this century: the two world wars and the cold war. Now, fueled
not only by latent industrial revolutions but those of
transportation, technology, and communications- information as
well, the Southern nations are ready to take their place in the
sun. An American strategic vision in the new era must acknowledge
these rising expectations, since a vision of a brave new world
within the realist paradigm that does not take into account the
human condition worldwide is fundamentally at odds with American
values. In the long run, such a vision will stand no more chance
of garnering decisive authority than will a vision that ignores
the human condition on the domestic front.
In all this a new strategic vision must ultimately come to
grips with the management of power. Once again, the proper mix of
change and continuity will be the key. In terms of continuity, of
course, there is the enormous leverage that the United States
possesses because of the victory in the cold war. America simply
cannot afford to ignore that situation. In the game of cricket,
after a successful "at bat," a team with good defensive
capabilities can voluntarily relinquish its bat to the opposing
side with the expectation of winning the game. International
relations will not likely provide such an option for the United
States in the current transition period. The game will thus
continue without relief against a new succession of opponents,
each with bowlers and batmen never encountered before.200
But the long war-in-peace has also brought about major
changes for the United States in terms of all three levels of
analysis. As a result, any vision for managing power that remains
fixed on a completely dominant, cold war-like American role in
the international arena will eventually lose decisive authority
to implement that vision as the current transition continues.
Such a vision could also trigger a reaction that either ignores
the realist paradigm by retreating into some form of isolationism
and protectionism, or causes a premature shift of that framework.
The realist paradigm, however, is still viable. The solution is
to convince the American people that the threat in the
international arena requires a centralization in the management
of power within that paradigm, much like that which occurred in

1815. A vision that incorporates a great power concert will allow
the United States to address its domestic problems and thus keep
American values intact, while continuing to provide leadership in
global politics. It is a vision that Castlereagh, Wilson and
Kennan would understand.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The commonest error in politics is sticking to the
carcasses of dead policies. When a mast falls overboard
you do not try to save a rope here and a spar there in
memory of their former utility; you cut away the hamper
altogether. And it should be the same with a policy.
But it is not so. We cling to the shred of an old
policy after it has been torn to pieces; and to the
shadow of the shred after the rag itself has been
thrown away.
Lord Salisbury
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In the life of societies and international systems
there comes a time when the question arises whether all
the possibilities of innovation inherent in a given
structure have been exhausted. At this point, symptoms
are taken for cause; immediate problems absorb the
attention that should be devoted to determining their
significance. Events are not shaped by a concept of the
future; the present becomes all-intrusive. However
impressive such a structure may still appear to
outsiders, it has passed its zenith. It will grow ever
more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.
Henry Kissinger
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We playwrights who have to cram a whole human life or
an entire historical era into a two-hour play, can
scarcely understand this rapidity [of change]
ourselves. And if it gives us trouble, think of the
trouble it must give political scientists who have less
experience with the realm of the improbable.
Vaclav Havel
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A student one time questioned Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky's
biographer, concerning Deutscher's assertion that Trotsky was an
extremely far-sighted person. Not one of Trotsky's predictions,
the student argued, had come to fruition. "Not yet," Deutscher is
reported to have replied, "which shows you just how far-sighted
he really was."204 The anecdote demonstrates just how important
reference points can be. It also illustrates the type of
rationalization used by many international relations theorists as
they look for alternatives to the realist paradigm.
In this regard, Thomas Kuhn has described three types of
phenomena about which new theory might be developed. The first is
already well explained by existing paradigms. There is thus
neither motive nor need for new theory construction. At the other
extreme are the phenomena of recognized anomalies which cannot be

assimilated by existing paradigms and, as a consequence, require
framework shifts in order to be explained. Somewhere between are
the phenomena whose nature is indicated by existing paradigms,
but whose details require further theory articulation in order to
be understood fully.205
It is in this middle category that the phenomena resulting
from an increasingly complex and interdependent world belong in
terms of the realist paradigm. Theories of change abound, of
course, to explain those phenomena. But as Kuhn pointed out, a
paradigm "is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is
available to take its place."206 And few theorists are ready to
make that claim in terms of the state-centric realist framework.
"What is occurring in the world is not a serious demise of states
as the central actors in the system," one critic concluded, ". .
. but rather their acceptance that they have to work together in
controlling a variety of interdependencies."207
Any such cooperation will take place within the realist
paradigm. For the interdependence that emerged in the
international system during the cold war has unleashed a variety
of disintegrative as well as integrative forces. The task for
American statesmen in this transition period is to convince the
people of the United States that the dangers and potentials of
these forces are great enough to require continued American
involvement and leadership in international affairs. At the same
time, that leadership must include a major role in moving the
other great powers toward a consensual condominium that can
realistically centralize the management of power in a self-help,
anarchical world. All this will require a strategic vision that
creates a picture of this desired continuity and change, credible
enough to achieve authority for implementation.
Oddly enough, statesmen in the current transition period can
take heart in this difficult endeavor from the experience of the
Viscount Castlereagh who, in the wake of the Vienna Congress,
lost the authority to implement his strategic vision. The British
statesman is proof nonetheless that men become myths not because
of what they know, not even because of what they do, but because
of the tasks they set out for themselves. For Castlereagh, that
task was to bring insular Great Britain into the peacetime
Continental political dialogue in order to preserve a European
equilibrium of force. To this end, between 1815 and 1820 the
British statesman was instrumental in inaugurating a series of
congresses at which all the great powers assembled to discuss
ways to maintain the European balance. Toward the end of that
period, however, the conservative eastern powers began to use
those forums to legitimize interference in newly emerging liberal
regimes in Europe. As a consequence, there was a public outcry in
England against Castlereagh and his policy so strong that he was
driven from office. Shortly thereafter he committed suicide. But
his strategic vision lived on. For the Great Powers, including
Great Britain, had become accustomed through the congress system
to periodic meetings for resolving differences. The eventual

result was the Concert of Europe, which helped produce a century
of relative peace among the great powers of Europe.208
For American statesmen, a similar success in achieving the
implementation of a strategic vision to guide the United States
through this third major transition of the 20th century will
require that they successfully issue a new call to greatness to
the American people. This time, however, there will be no clarion
calls for stirring crusades against fascism and communism.
Instead, the call must be focused on creating stability in the
international order, on averting chaos in an anarchical world.
The problem is that while equilibrium is a necessity for that
stability, it does not constitute a sufficient purpose for the
American people, with their historic sense of mission. Peace must
be presented as more than the absence of conflict. Stability must
be perceived as a bridge to the realization of human aspirations,
not an end in itself.
In the final analysis, American statesmen must create an
image of desired change within the realist paradigm that inspires
their citizens to efforts at least as great and for goals at
least as grand as those that marked the 40-year war-in-peace. It
is a picture that the great Ulysses could paint to his comrades,
even at the end of 10 years of warfare followed by a decade
spent in fruitless efforts to return home to his beloved Ithaca:
Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world. . . .
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
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